



SPECIAL  
COLLECTIONS



# DOUGLAS LIBRARY

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY  
AT KINGSTON

KINGSTON ONTARIO CANADA





R U L E S  
O F  
G O V E R N M E N T :  
O r , a t r u e  
B A L A N C E  
B E T W E E N  
S O V E R E I G N T Y  
A N D  
L I B E R T Y .

W R I T T E N

By a Person of Honour, immediately after  
the late CIVIL WAR. And now Publi-  
shed, to prevent Another.

---

L O N D O N :

Printed for BERNARD LINTOTT at the *Cross-  
Keys*, between the *Two Temple-Gates*, in  
*Fleetstreet*. 1710.



---

---

# THE PREFACE.

**T**HE following Papers were written by a Person that had been bred and liv'd long in a Court, and having suffer'd in the late Times, saw the dangerous Rocks upon which both Prince and People had split, and therefore in his private Retirement made these Reflections, as hoping that such just Weights and Measures might preserve the Balance better for the future.

They could not have been publish'd at a more seasonable Time than the present, when the Nation, both out of Duty and Inclination, are willing to shew all due Obe-

## The P R E F A C E.

dience and Submission to their Prince ; and yet on the other hand, from the Dangers they have lately escap'd, are watchful for the Defence of their Laws and Liberties. It is not for the Interest of the Nation, that the Prince or People should carry their good Intentions too far, so as to be extravagant in their Complaisance, or be too reserv'd through the Abundance of their Caution.

The Author has justify'd the Honour of Human Nature against Mr. *Hobbs's* Notions of Power, in so short, and yet so plain a Manner, that it is the Sum of those Arguments that are contain'd in larger Volumes.

He recommends the Virtues that become a Prince, with such masterly Strokes, that make the Image extremely beautiful and admirable. The Prophetick Author, though not designedly, draws the Character of her present Majesty ; and it being done  
so

# The P R E F A C E.

so long ago, it is plain that he could have no Thoughts of Flattery. Former Ages may have given us the Character of an accomplish'd Prince, but it is the Happiness of our Age to enjoy and see one in Perfection.

---

THE

---

# THE CONTENTS.

<b>G</b> overnment, as examin'd by Reason.	Page 1
The Object of Government stands in Persons or Things.	p. 2
The Reverence due to Authority.	p. 4
The Powers of Sovereignty, or the Prerogatives of it.	p. 5
Sovereign Persons.	p. 8
Paternal Power.	ibid.
Monarchy the best Form of Government.	p. 9
How Paternal Government ceas'd, and the People came to have a hand in the Election.	ibid.
Why Princes were not questionable.	p. 10
Whose Trustees Sovereigns are.	p. 12
Limitation of Sovereignty expounded.	p. 13
Why God leaves a whole People to one, or few Mens Rule, who may abuse it.	p. 15
Why God often permits Subjects to be rebellious.	p. 16
Paternal Government.	p. 18
Scriptural Directions for a King.	p. 19
There is no Distinction between a King's Person and his Power.	p. 21
God, who is the only Punisher of Princes, yet permits Subjects sometimes to be a Scourge to their Princes.	p. 22
How ruinous it is to a People to affect a new form of Government.	p. 24
	How

# The Contents.

<i>How loyal the primitive Christians were.</i>	ibid.
<i>The Romish Doctrine about Subjection.</i>	p. 25
——— Calvin	ibid.
——— Luther	ibid.
<i>What the Law of England requires.</i>	p. 27
<i>The King of England an absolute, tho' not an arbitrary Monarch.</i>	ibid.
<i>Axioms of Law.</i>	ibid.
<i>Allegiance sworn to him, not only by single Men but the Three Estates.</i>	ibid.
<i>Limitation of the Prerogative.</i>	p. 29
<i>The Monarchy absolute in Parliament.</i>	ibid.
<i>The Necessity of a good Intelligence between the King and the Two Houses of Parliament.</i>	p. 32
<i>The Choice of Parliament Men.</i>	ibid.
<i>Enemies to the Form of Government, rather than the Governors.</i>	p. 34
<i>Government how grounded.</i>	p. 35
<i>Mr. Hobbs considered.</i>	ibid.
<i>How Mr. Hobbs makes the Passions, and not the moral Vertues, the Foundation of Government.</i>	ib.
<i>If Mr. Hobbs's way of stating the Question be true, the Creature is wiser than the Creator.</i>	p. 37
<i>God vested Government with Power and Majesty.</i>	p. 38
——— Power.	ibid.
——— Majesty.	p. 39
<i>The Prince the true Representative of a Nation.</i>	p. 40
——— His Power and his Majesty both necessary.	ibid.
<i>The Personal Vertues of a Prince.</i>	ibid.
——— Piety.	ibid.
——— Justice.	p. 41
——— Faithfulness.	p. 42
<i>How Embassadors ought to manage themselves in Treaties.</i>	p. 43
——— Clemency.	p. 44
	Mo-

# The Contents.

———Modesty.	P. 45
———Liberality.	P. 47
———Frugality.	P. 48
———Love of Fame.	P. 49
———Prudence.	P. 52
Choice of Officers.	P. 54
Choice of Counsellors about a Prince.	ibid.
Character of a Counsellor.	P. 57
How much it is in the Power of a Prince to make good Counsellors for himself.	P. 64
Princes menial Servants.	P. 65
A Favourite of Pleasure allowable, but not to be made a Favourite of Business.	P. 68
A Prince's great Family are Orders of Men in this Nation.	P. 69

---

RULES

---



---

# RULES OF GOVERNMENT:

Or, a true

## BALANCE

BETWEEN

Sovereignty and Liberty.

**G**OD, and Nature made Men sociable *Government*  
Creatures, which appears by this, *as examin'd*  
That every Man affects a Compan- *by Reason.*  
nion; which arises from this, that  
every single Man stands in need of another's help.  
Men could not have lived together in a Body po-  
litick, if God had not disposed the natural Inclina-  
tions of their Minds for such a Society, and the  
same reason, that leads them, to cohabit together  
extracted from them the preferring of publick Good,  
before private Interest, or the whole before any Part.  
So as Government is an Ordinance of God, and  
not an Invention of Man, and arises not, as  
Mr. *Hobbs* would make it, from the Passion of  
Fear, which one Man had of another, but from  
the Moral Virtue of Justice, to do as one would  
be done unto.

This makes the politick Body, so much to re-  
semble the natural, the Brain must be distin-  
guished

guished from the Head, and the Heart from the Liver. If one Part gives Life, another must Sense, and a third Nutrition. The Understanding (or Prince, or Sovereign Power) must give the Law, and animal Spirits (or Nobility) must influence the Nerves, or Instruments of Motion through the whole Body, or subordinate Officers, to set on Work, the Muscles (or organical Members, or Commonalty) to perform the several Offices, which belong to the several Faculties of the Soul of Government.

But we will not affectedly follow Metaphors, or Resemblances, which only serve for Illustration, but not for Proof.

The Object of Government, stands in Persons Ruling, who are either Supreme, whether the Supremacy lies in one or more Persons. Here Rule, or Government is uncontrollable, yet with an Eye and Duty to publick Weal or *Salus Populi*, and an Accountableness to God; or else they are subordinate Magistrates under him, or them, in whom the Supremacy is lodg'd. These rule by the Sovereign's Commission; the Powers whereof they are not to exceed, and they are accountable for the Execution thereof, not to God only, but to Man likewise.

The Persons Ruled, are the People in general, that is the Nobility, either Ecclesiastical or Civil, and the Commons.

These three Estates of Men, which among us make up a Parliament, are united to the King or Supreme as Members with their Head, they represent the whole Body of the People unto the King, but the King is the true Representative of the People to all the World.

The Sovereign is the virtual Body of the Nation, the three Estates are the Representative Body, and the People themselves are the Essential One.

As the Object of Government stands in Things, they are either Prerogatives, which are in Defence of the Government it self, and of the Sovereign Person and to be made use of in both Cases, or else Laws civil or municipal for securing the Lives, Liberties, Properties, &c. of the Subject. Thus, *ad Casarem Potestas omnium pertinet, ad singulos Proprietas*. Power belongs to a Prince and Property to the Subject. Or else it stands in Matters, Divine, Civil or Military, that is, Religion, Justice, Counsel, Commerce, Confederation, Treasure, Arms by Sea and Land : For these seven are the great Sinews, Nerves or Pillars of Government.

Government and Governors are both God's Ordinances, for though he himself was the sole Legislator in all those Matters which concern'd Man's ultimate Happiness, yet he left Men by the Light of their own natural Reason to make such Laws as concern'd their Civil Interest, or their Concerns of this Life, as natural Reason dictated unto them; and because no Society could be formed, and kept together, but by equal and just Laws, nor those executed, but by some Persons, therefore both Laws and Governours were made sacred, the one to be observed and the other to be revered: therefore God owns both, and puts an Impression of part of his own Honour, both on humane Laws, and Sovereign Persons, though both these may be infirm and failing; for Princes, or Sovereigns may err as well in making Laws, or in their Judgments about them, as in the Execution of them, or in their own Manners. And therefore God obliged Princes to be well advised about making Laws, and as nigh as they could, to follow sound Reason, and the best Precedents, and to do all with Deliberation, and good Advice, and with an Eye to publick Utility.

Government  
and Govern-  
ors.

*The Re-  
verence into  
Authority.*

Nevertheless because these Concerns were but about matters of an indifferent nature, and they coming under so many divers Circumstances, it often puzzled a wise, and a sincere Governour what to ordain; and the Narrowness of Men's Understanding, whilst the Business was in Council or Agitation, often making that appear best, which as soon as perfected was often discerned not to be so; and this Wisdom, and Sincerity (though not in probability so grossly, and so often) might fail in Council, as well as Folly, and Negligence, therefore he stamp'd his own Authority, both upon humane Laws, and Governors, thereby to keep them back from being affronted; and upon this Ground it was, that Laws were by the same Authority that made them to be revoked, or repealed. Thus the humane Authority, from whence these Laws flowed, silenced all private Judgment and became indisputable, there being nothing to be put in the Ballance with it: It being only the Prerogative of God's Laws, to be entertained for their Excellency; Mens for the Authority, or Station they were in: Otherwise all Government had been precarious, or subjected so to change, as to be unsteady, or endless, and so useless. This every Master of a Family shall find, if he give way to his Wife, Children, and Servants, to dispute his Commands, much more than a Lord or Sovereign over a whole Nation. And this should make every Master of a Family as careful to keep the Honour of his Prince in his great Family, as he would his own in his little Family.

Sovereignty therefore was by Divine Ordinance made unquestionable else it could never have answered the true ends of Government. Divine Wisdom therefore necessarily armed (even in be-  
half

half of the governed) the Supreme Governors with these Powers following.

A Power, though not to prescribe a Religion, *The Powers for God, had done that, yet to protect it, and to look to the good Administration of it, so that natural Piety might be cherish'd, and God's Word, or Revelations be by publick Authority maintain'd, And thus far every State or Government, both Gentile, and Jew as well as Christian hath interested themselves in matters of Religion.* *of Sovereignty, or the Prerogatives of it.*

A Power to maintain all Sovereign Prerogatives, which were necessarily lodged in the Sovereign for the Maintainance of his own Authority.

A Power to make such Laws, as related to the civil Concerns, Good, and Safety of that People; for in vain had been the first two, if there had been no Provision made for the last; for if Innovators and Conspirators might act securely, and Government be undermined and Governors exposed, private Mens Peace would be soon overthrown, and new Laws, and new Governors frequently obtruded on them; therefore every one was bound with Life and Fortune to defend the Prerogatives of the Government he lived under, as much as the Municipal Laws, by which he was maintained in his Life, Liberty and Property.

A Power of Equity was necessarily intrusted with Sovereigns, because there would be oft Occasion, to abate the Severity of Laws; for if Extremities in Contracts, and penalty in Laws should be always taken, Laws would often be Snares, and often be too burthenfome, to be born.

A Power to pardon the Breach of Laws, since Mercy adorns the Throne, as well as Justice, and no Hand is to hold forth this Scepter, but his, who holds the Sword, that so the Sovereign might be as well loved, as feared.

A Power to execute the Penalties of all Laws, that thus Authority might be feared for its Power, as it was to be beloved for its Clemency; and the Forfeiture or Advantage, that accrued by the Penalty (if pecuniary) was answerable to the Exchequer, since the Offence was against the Government.

A Power to stamp Moneys, or to appoint some one thing, which should be the Standard unto all Commodities, or which should equal the Value of them; which is a great Evidence of Sovereignty, since here is a Power, that in a Prince's own Dominions (and upon such Conjunctions of times, as may be, when such a Power even for want of Treasure, and for common Safety may require it) he can appoint this Standard, to be of an inferiour Value to the thing it's changed for; the Authority of the Prince, making that valuable among Buyers and Sellers at home, though not abroad, which answers not to the intrinsic Value of the thing bought.

A Power to call together Assemblies, and Synods, and to dissolve them, so as no Men in Numbers (because Danger may arise to the Peace thereby) have in any well ordered State, Liberty to meet together, but as warranted thereunto by Authority, lest Multitudes should tumultuate, or innovate and bring Petitions on their Spears Head, or make private Judgment stand in competition with publick Authority.

A Power to create all Nobility, the Prince being the Fountain of all Honour; as likewise to make all Ministers of State at home, as great Officers, Judges, Councillors and all subordinate Magistrates; for Supreme Power must be the Root of all other Powers, and of all Titles, and it must be one in it self; for Power, that is to preserve Peace, is capable of no Rivalship, or Co-ordination; for that would distract Obedience at  
home

home and abroad. No foreign Nation can entertain Treaties with any other, whose Sovereignty or Singleness of Power appears with Uncertainty, where it is lodged: So as Co-ordination is inconsistent with all kinds of Government; for two of equal Powers, since they may be of divers Minds, must distract, not settle, or make peaceable any Government.

A Power of sending Ambassadors to foreign Princes; the Ambassador's Office being to represent the Prince, as the Prince doth his whole Nation, and by this Means commerce about Trade, Leagues offensive and defensive are made with other Nations.

A Power of making War and Peace; for it's fit none judge of the proper Reasons and Seasons for these great Engagements but that Person (or other Persons) in whom the Supremacy, and Sovereignty is lodged; Princes are prudent, when they observe the Bent and Inclination of their People in Affairs even of this great Consequence; but Subjects invade the Prince's Right, when they intermingle herein more than humbly shewing their Sentiment of it.

These are necessary Qualifications of all kind of Sovereignty, and these are called Prerogatives, or Regal Powers, for no Kingdom, Commonwealth, or State can want these; and these Powers must be lodged in one or some great Persons, and so the Government and Governors stand both by the Ordinance of God as by his Divine Institution.

Now to acknowledge the Supreme Governors, and yet to undermine them in these Rights, is a subtil Part of Disloyalty; for give them a great Title, and no other to determine the most important concerns, or not to dispense Rewards and Punishments, and they will soon be reputed but as Idols, and be first despised, and then dethroned.

How

How they might be herein limited unto the end he or they may the more deliberately execute these Powers, shall be shewed hereafter.

These Powers, the Prince, or State (nay the People, if they understood their own Concern) are as much bound to defend, as they are the Municipal Laws of the Land made in behalf of themselves; for Prerogatives are to be kept as sacred as Laws; one is, to defend the Government, the other the Subjects under the Government: One ought as truly to be made use of for the safety, and Utility of the whole Body of, the People, as the other for particular Men; for true publick Safety, was the Mother of all this Prerogative, and *Salus Populi Suprema Lex*, The Safety of the People is the Supreme Law.

*Sovereign  
Persons.*

Thus we see these Powers, to the end they may be executed, must be lodged in Persons; and no Government can want these Powers, or Persons, so as whoever invades either of them, everthrows all Government, or disables it to provide for the Safety of the People or Body politick.

If these Powers be lodged in one Person, then the Form of Government is called a *Monarchy*; if in a few chief, or choice Men, *Aristocracy*; if in all the People it is a *Democracy*. Deviation from these are termed, *Tyranny*, *Oligarchy*, *Ochlocracy*.

For my own part, I cannot believe that there can be any such kind of Government, as pure *Democracy*; for if the Supreme Power be lodged in the whole People, then they are both Governors and Governed, and many Absurdities will follow, as will be shewed hereafter.

*Paternal  
Power.*

Hence it is, that God made paternal Power the Foundation of all civil Government: And from hence most reasoning Men agree, that Monarchical Government is best suiting with God's Ordinance and the Benefit of Society; for even *Aristotle* himself

himself, bred in and amongst Republicks, allows Monarchy as the fittest Organ for the Soul of Government to work by, as through its Unity less subject to Divisions, and as fittest for Secrecy and Expedition, and being hereditary, and not elective, it is agreed freest from Factions, or laying wait for Changes, or bribing for Voices, which are unavoidable and dangerous in all popular Elections; so as it may be said, by all these natural Advantages God *instituted* Monarchy, and permits only other Forms. But be the Form what it will, the last Appeal must be Sovereign, and must have Power to exercise all the beforementioned Marks of Sovereignty, or else the Government must be imperfect.

*Monarchy  
the best  
Form of Government.*

When paternal Government ceaseth, that is to say, when the *Communis Stirps*, or first Parent was grown through collateral Lines, not to be readily known, or to be come at, and that Genealogies, and Relations were not exactly kept, and that mixt Families were numerously join'd together, and when large Colonies were sent, to plant void Countries, then choice was made of some eminent Man, to be a Leader, or Duke, or Guide, or Prince, or whatever they would call him (or of some Optimates, or chief Men, or Sanhedrim, or what Form best pleased) to go in and out before the People, or to exercise the Sovereign Power. Thus the People who had no hand in the Government (for that was purely God's Ordinance) came at last, when paternal Government ceaseth to have a Power of Consent in disposing and lodging Government in one or more Persons. Hence it is that Government is called, by one Apostle, the Ordinance of God, and by another, the Ordinance of Man; for Power is originally from God in the Abstract, and Substance of it, though in the Concrete or Specification, or in respect of Circumstances

*How paternal Government ceaseth, and the People to have a hand in the Election.*

cumstances thereunto belonging (as whether the Title be King or Commonwealth, the Jurisdiction limited, or absolute) from Men; which in effect is the true Exposition, or Reconciliation of the two great Apostles.

*Why Princes  
were not  
questiona-  
ble.*

However, though he, that assumed this Power without consent, was an Usurper, yet when the Power was once lodged, or disposed by consent, or Submission, it could not be reassumed; for though the People submitted their own Necks, yet they gave not the Government; for the Government by an indiscernable Providence, when the Form is agreed on, is to be assigned to God; and it appears to belong to him, since the essential part of it, *viz.* the Power of Life and Death belongs singly to him; for no Man hath Power over his own Life, and therefore he cannot give it to another. His Wisdom therefore thought not fit, to trust the Giddiness of the People in general, with a Matter of such Concern even unto their own Peace, and Welfare; for often Changes, which they would have affected, would have been more pernicious to the Good of Society, than moderate, nay immoderate Pressures. Hence it was even in order to publick Weal, that Sovereign Authority was set above all private Judgment, to avoid Disputes, as well as his, or their Persons, that executed it.

The Sovereign Power by Consent once lodged in one, or many for the same Reason, is not reassumable; for we see originally that Power was not, nor could ever be lodged in the diffusive Body of the People, who had not a Power over their own Lives, and so could less have over others; for Government was no humane Invention, but God's Ordinance. When People first elected their Governors, we may say it answered unto God's Providence, when by Rebellion, or Defection they

they changed him, it was his Permission; for when a People demerits of him, he withstands not their intrangling themselves and scratching themselves with their own Briars: So as when the Form of Government is once settled, the Posterity, or Successors of that People are bound by the Consent, and choice of their Forefathers because they are reputed; to live in their Predecessors, and they are said to be alive in them. And thus when Providence, in the Place of natural Governors or Parents, introduced civil, the whole diffusive Body of the governed were to be (in this Respect of Change of their Form of Government) reputed in the State of Wives, or of Children, or Minors; for though the one might have chosen, whether she would have disposed her self to such a Man, to be her Husband: yet having done it, she was always under his Subjection, so the Heir is during his Minority to his Guardian; yet both Husband and Guardian ought to do all right to their Charge; and Courts there are, to relieve both, as God's Throne or Court is to relieve Subjects: Children and Wives may be thus relieved, but they are not to resist.

Hence likewise it is, that Princes are not to be resisted by Subjects, and both philosophical Light and politick serve to discern this as well as Divine Light. For says moral *Epictetus*, *We are not tied to Parents, and Governors as they are good, but as they are Parents and Governors.* And deep sighted *Tacitus* says, *Good Princes are to be wisht and prayed for, bad (or whatever they proved) are to be endured;* and he gives the Reason for it, for ill Princes are to be endured as we do Storms and Tempests, which are showered down upon us from above, or from the Providence which hath an Hand in giving them, and an Eye to observe, how we entertain them. Thus

God required Non-Resistance in order to the Subjects own Good; for Anarchy was worse than Tyranny; and yet at the same time if the Prince's Command was immoral, he enjoyed Non Obedience, before the temporal or immoral Command, which flowed from Man's Unreasonableness.

*Whose Trustees Sovereigns are.*

Hence likewise it appears, that Men are not to think, because Princes or States are trusted for them, or appointed for their good, therefore they are conditional Trustees to them, for those in whom the Sovereign Power is lodged, are God's Trustees, and therefore to God only are they to answer for their Trust,

Nor is a Prince less than his People; because he was trusted either by, or for them, and even by God's Appointment is to Minister to them for their Good; for the same Reason would make Angels lesser than Men, because Angels are God's Ministers for the good of Men.

However primarily the Prince or State are trusted for the good of Subjects; for they are set over Men, as the Sun is over the World, to enlighten and influence it, and they shall be accountable for it. But secondarily, They are intrusted to maintain the Dignity and Rights of their own regal Power, and not to let every Humour of the People disable them to govern, by pulling from them the Feathers of their Prerogatives.

This Subjection, which God requires, is no unreasonable thing; for we perceive it but a Suffering in Matters of Mens external Concerns. For, as hath been said, Governours Authorities extend but to Matters of an indifferent Nature. It is often Pride and Impatience which produce Complaints, as may appear by this, That most commonly when the times are most plentiful, and the Grievances very tolerable, then delicacy of  
Sense

Sense renders Men most querulous, and their Sufferings are begot more from their Inferences and Reasonings what may follow, than what they feel; so as they must be beholden to their Ingenuity, before they can justify their Complaints. Reflect on the Reign of *Charles* the First, as I have impartially made some Memoirs upon it, and this will be found true.

Thus much for the Singleness of Government, and the Non Resistance of the Governed.

But it is objected, Is it not more reasonable to have a co-ordinate Power joined with that of the Prince? No sure; for no Government can admit a distinct equal Power within itself; for this is but like the Doctrine of Polytheisme: For making many Gods and many Sovereigns is equally absurd; Co-ordination is like to prove the Mother of a Civil War. However, Limitation of Sovereignty is agreed on by all Politicians, and Civilians, to be consistent even with Sovereignty itself. For hereby Sovereignty is not taken from the Person, or Persons governing, though to him or them the Absoluteness of the Execution, for some time, or in some part of the Sovereign Power (as not to make Laws without the three Estates or Orders of Subjects, *viz.* Nobility, Clergy, and Commons Consent) be suspended; for hereby the Power is not transferred unto any other; so he or they remain absolute, though limited. For thus, as he or they cannot do it without another, so no other body can do it without him or them; and when it is done it is done singly by the Prince, if it be in a Monarchy; or by the State, if it be in an Aristocracy. For a limited (which we call a mixt) Monarchy, or a mixt Commonweal is in such Cases but like a Man that is bound, or a Man that is sleeping, he hath temporally lost his Motion, but not his Strength

*Limitation  
of Sovereignty  
explained.*

Strength ; for as soon as he hath the Concurrence of those whose Consent he stipulated to take, then he is unbound or awakened ; and then he or they (not the Concurrers) are said to act solely and sovereignly ; for the Power is virtually in his or their Persons that represent the Sovereignty. For it is the Monarch's or State's affirmative Voice that makes the Law or Sanction, and it is his, or their negative Voice that rejects it. Thus the Sovereign Person, or Persons, is the single Soul of the Law, and all this to avoid the ill Consequences of Co ordination. And hence it is, that the true Representative of any People is the Prince, in a Monarchy, or the States in a Commonweal ; and from him or them there is no Appeal, but unto God, and wherever the last Appeal is, there is the Sovereignty. And therefore the People abate of their own Greatness, when they think any represent them but their Prince or State ; others may represent them in order, to represent their Condition good or bad to the Prince, as a Looking-Glass doth represent the Body to the Head's view ; but as bearing their Image both at home and abroad, the Prince only represents the State of the People. An unequal League with a Foreigner takes not off supreme Power. The same may be said of paying Tribute, because that may be for redeeming any Injury, or for some acknowledgment of a Deliverance ; but that payed, it is all that can be demanded. Neither is Feudal Obligation any Deprivation of Sovereignty, since that is but a personal Obligation or Service, but gives no risk to his Government who is bound to this Observance. Thus careful Civilians and Politicians are to keep Sovereignty sacred, though by such ties as these it may seem or appear restrained.

But

But least some should complain of Providence for giving these great Powers unto Princes and States, who are but frail Men: On God's Behalf we will sum up the Reasons for it usually given.

1<sup>st</sup>, God requires the Prince to rule for the good of his Subjects. 2<sup>dly</sup>, If they do not, he denounces himself a Revenger. 3<sup>dly</sup>, He requires Obedience and Non-Resistance to prevent Civil Dissentions, which are usually worse than Tyranny; for Tyrants generally extend not their Oppressions upon a whole Nation, but some particular Persons they are displeas'd with, whilst Civil War, or popular Commotions, spread over the whole Land, and amongst nigh Relations; and if Subjects may resist for any one Reason which they will alledge, it is very probable they will never want a Reason. 4<sup>thly</sup>, God often experiments, whether Subjects will depend upon his Promises, to restrain the fierceness of Princes, or on their own impatient Humours and Violences, or whether by an humble Patience they will wait his time for Redress, since what Men can't resist at one time, they find they may divert at another. 5<sup>thly</sup>, He subjects People to these Pressures, because they deserve such a Scourge, as an ill Prince, for being themselves so disobedient to himself. Or 6<sup>thly</sup>, Because very often they force a good-natur'd Prince to be an ill one, as *Boccalini* says, *The Sheep getting the Dogs Teeth into their own Mouths to the Danger of the Sheperd*. Or because like *Neapolitan* Horses, if they be well dress'd and fed, they will endure no Rider. Last<sup>ly</sup>, Because a Prince's Tyranny can but reach unto the outward Man, and to the outward things of a Man, which God's wise Providence in this World often exposes, to wean Men from it, and to draw them to expect their ultimate Happiness or Rest in another World.

*Why God leaves a whole People to one, or a few Mens Rule, who may abuse it.*

Why God of-  
ten permits  
Subjects to  
be rebellious

Thus, though a bad as well as a good Prince be thus secured by God, God hath not assured him but he will punish him, even by permitting an ill Spirit to rise betwixt him and his People, and so it's God's Sentence on the Prince, (to whose Tribunal he stands bound) though a Judgment or Punishment on them both. The Prince is justly punish'd by God, for violating the natural Right of his Subjects, and for breach of his Obligation or Oath unto them, that he would govern them by their Laws, and be careful of them both in their Lives and Liberties. For Natural, Civil, and Divine Right teaches the Head to consult for the good of the Body, and the Body readily to bolster the Head, since the Diseases of the Head are dangerous to the safety of the Body.

Thus far we may say, this Question about Government, and the Nature and End of Sovereignty, is examin'd singly by sound Reason or Reasoning. Next, let us again enquire after it by the Word of God, and after that particularly by our own National Laws.

Now the same things come to be examined by Scripture, or God's Word, as it is expounded by our own Church.

No Constitution of Government can be so happily framed, as by its single Fabrick to secure the Peace of a Nation, else surely God's *Theocracy* amongst the Jews, and paternal Government among the Patriarchs, and the Kings of *Judah* would have been so manag'd, as to have prevented all Complaints. When divine as well as prophane History shall be consulted, it will be found that Policy is like Morality, and may be much improved by these two Words, SUSTAIN and ABSTAIN. For the Prince must abstain from Violence or Rapine, and neither for his Pleasures, nor Ambitions, may he suffer himself to prey on his People; and often he must bear with  
or

or sustain their perverse or froward Humours, lest unseasonably stirring them he make a Fermentation which he cannot quiet; and Subjects will find the Blessing of Government flows more from their Passive Obedience than from any other nice Care of their Liberties. For Impatience of Subjects has overthrown more States than the Tyranny of Princes. And most commonly God will not send a People good Governours, when they will not fit themselves to bear ill ones. It was therefore not only the Wisdom, but the Goodness of God toward Subjects, that he made Sovereign Persons only answerable to himself; all other ways are, as *Hosea* says, *Setting up of Kings*; but not by him, or his Oeconomy pleases them not, and therefore they eat sowre Grapes, or frame to themselves false Principles, and their Teeth are set an Edge, or they destroy the Peace they hunt after. For the politick Body, like the natural, when it will endure no ayle, but have immediate recourse to strong Physick, will soon purge it self out of the World. But nothing of this that is said infers, that Men should not defend the Rights of Free-born Subjects, but that they defend them in the proper Place, or Judicatures of the Land, and not by the Sword.

But he that gave Law to every Species of Creatures, gave one to Mankind, which Man less exactly observes, by Reason of the Freedom of his Will, and by Reason of his lapsed Nature. But from the Law of his Nature, or from the Moral Law, the best Judicial Law is framed; which may be found by observing how this Law, among God's own People the *Israelites*, suits with the Moral Law, given to or for all Mankind. But at present we will extend this no farther than to Persons ruling, or Legislators; and observe what Characters God in his Word puts upon them; and how he fences them from Resistance, and how he tyes all

Commonalties to them by Obedience. For throughout all Scripture Kings are said not to reign over Persons, but Nations; therefore called King of *Israel*, *Judah*, &c, and Head of the Tribes of *Israel*; so of all States under him.

Paternal  
Government

Scripture sets forth how the first Man was born under Government, as God's Subject, how all his Posterity were under him, and consequently how paternal Government was the Original of all Government; and so all Mankind born under Government. And therefore the Precept of honouring Fathers (or Parents) being a Moral Precept, it is a Proof that Government is founded in Nature, and was by Extraction, and not Consent. How paternal Government ceas'd, hath been already set forth. *Nimrod*, by Sir *Walter Rawleigh* is esteemed a Hunter, or Usurper, because he took upon him the Government, over others, without their Consent, or voluntary Submission or Charge, not that he was an ill Prince.

And in Scripture, the Sanction or Reward that is proposed for performing this Duty, shews the Benefit of Obedience; for it is, *That thy Days may be long in the Land which the Lord thy God shall give thee*. For Obedience of Inferiors (as hath been likewise observed) is the most probable way to Peace, and Peace unto a Society's Welfare. Hence it is, that Men are so strictly charged to reverence their Governours, and Governours to look upon themselves as Ministers of God for good, and as Revengers to execute Wrath upon him that doth Evil. So as his Power must be no Terror to good Works, but employed for the Good and Praise, or Encouragement, of those that do well.

When the Governour was not a natural Father, to the end that he might not want natural Affection unto his People; if the People wanted one, they were not to choose a Stranger, but such an one as *Moses*, *Joshuah*, *Samuel* or *David*; or whom  
God

God appointed, as *Saul*, see *Deutr.* xvii. where the Promise of a Prince and Virtues of a Prince are set forth, and so Kingly Rule shewn to be a Blessing, and Promise of God to his People from the beginning.

The Prince must have Humility, that his Heart be not lifted up above his Brethren. He must not multiply to himself Horses, lest Power incline him to be oppressive. He must not give his strength to Women, for Effeminacy abates Courage and Industry, and softens, and destroys him. And *Solomon* adds another Caution, *let him not drink Wine* (that is, to excess) *lest he forget God's Law, or neglect Religion, and pervert judgment*; for both Women and Wine make him unfit for the Hardships and Difficulties of Government. Nor must he increase Riches, that is for his own private Treasure, or by making his People miserable, and poor, make himself opulent, that he may the more securely tyrannize. But rich he must be, since the Ambition of his Neighbours, is at one time or another likely to disturb his Peace; and since the constant Charge, and contingent Expenses of Governours, is like to be so great, therefore a full Exchequer becomes a good, as well as a wise and politic Prince. Lastly, though human Policy must be used in human Affairs, and that it appears too hard to expect the same strictness of Morality in a King's Office which belongs to his Person, as a Man (which is too hard a Task for one no better vers'd in both these two Sciences than my self, to give the limits to) Yet this may be said, that the Prince is obliged, since Politicks flow from Ethicks, as high as possibly he can, to suit his Policies with good Morals, or rather, that he frame them out of (at least never contrary to) the Word of God; for this will make him truly worship his God, and best teach him how to demean himself with Men, or how to govern himself,

self, either in relation to his foreign or home Affairs. Nor can a Princes Policies warrant any thing which the Word of God forbids, but he must rather cast himself on Providence.

Such Delineations of a Prince, as these are, will convince Men, that not only Government, but Governours, are the Ordination of God; for *by me*, says God, *Kings reign*, which *Nebuchadnezzar* acknowledges, when he says to *Daniel*; *your God is a God of Gods, and a Lord of Kings, and he rules in the Kingdoms of the Earth, and he gives to whomsoever he will, and sets up over it*, (that is, whenever a People provoke him to send them that Curse) *the basest of men*; or as *Hosea* may seem to explain it, *they cast off his Government for Governments that men have framed*; for say they, *give us a King like the other Nations*; or let us cast off King *Charles I.* for a *Cromwell*, or *Christ* for a *Barabbas*. Thus People will sometimes set up a King, but not by God, and pull down a King to their own Confusion; which God divert them from doing any more,

But that they may not thus mischief themselves, God's Word describes a King's Power by his Character, *a King, against whom there is no rising*: and what is said of a King, is said of all Sovereign Persons, be they one, or more, a Monarchy, or an Aristocracy, a Kingdom, or a Commonweal: For if Subjects, upon Discontents, and Dissatisfactions, might change the settled Form of Government, the Politick Body like his Natural, that is always giving Phylick to himself, would be surely purged out of its settled Peace, and probably into its Grave: So as *Solomon* was very wise, and spake as well to the States of a Land, as unto particular Persons, when he said, *Be not given to change*, &c.

Fear God therefore, and honour the King, and curse not the King (that is) speak not Evil of him

him, or in discourse revile him. Remember he is thy politick Parent, go backward therefore and cover his Nakedness. *Shimei's* Cursings were but Revilings. Cut not off so much as the lap of his Garment, or approach him not with a profane Tongue; or Hand, as if he were not the Lord's Anointed; for he cannot be innocent, that lessens his Dignity, or clouds his Majesty. No, do not this in thy Heart, or in thy Bed-chamber; no, nor mingle with those that are given to change, for their Calamity shall rise suddenly; or a Bird, that is, some small or unlook'd for Accident shall betray thy Conspiracy, or who knows the Ruin of them? Or it shall fall upon them by some providential Accident, and their Ruin shall be as swift as their Plots were secret. For if God's Word in case of Oppression direct Men to cry unto him for Relief, and not to cry unto your Tents, *O Israel, what is our Resistance*, but to cast off our dependance on God's Providence, and to have recourse unto a Witch of *Endor*, or our own Impatience? Or like an injur'd Man, that will not let the Judge give Sentence, nor the Hangman execute him that robbed him, but he will do both Offices himself. Rebellion therefore is like the Sin of Witchcraft, it removes its dependance on God's Providence, and flies, as hath been said, unto an ill Spirit, or its own disobedient and vindicative Humour.

Nor must Men subtilize by distinguishing between the Power, and the Person; for that Apostle that says, be not afraid of the Power, expounds it by the Person; *for he is appointed by God, &c.* Thus a King's Person, and his Power cannot be separate, though they may be distinguish'd, or his Authority may be where his Person is not, but never his Authority can be wanting where his Person is. Whoever therefore will not do the Law of God written in his Book, nor of the King written in his Statutes, let Judgment be executed upon him,

him, whether it be unto Death, or Banishment, or Confiscation, or Imprisonment. And if this Command comes from *Artaxerxes* by *Ezra*, he would not have set it down, but as it was warrantable to execute. Nay the People of *Israel* themselves say as much to *Joshua*. *Whoever resists thy Commandments, and will not hearken to thy word (or Legislative Power) he shall be put to death, for whatever thou commandest we will do, and wherever thou sendest we will go, only the Lord thy God be with thee, as he was with Moses*, or be careful to rule thy self by God's Law, as we will be to rule our selves by thine; or contradict not thou thy own will establish'd by a Law, by some sudden or passionate Resolve.

God, who is  
the single  
Punisher of  
Princes, yet  
permits  
Subjects  
sometimes  
to be a  
Scourge to  
their Prin-  
ces.

Yet, as hath been observed before, though God hath reserved Princes for his own Tribunal, yet he hath shewn by several Instances in Scripture, very particularly in that of *Abimelech*, and the *Men of Shechem*, that he often makes Subjects by permitting it (for it is ever evil in the Subject) to become Scourges to their Prince, and both to work each other's Ruin. As a Scourge to *David* he lets the greatest of *Israel* rise against him, and follow his rebellious Son *Absalom*, and it was of the Lord (or his permission) that nine Tribes and a half forsook *Rehoboam*, and followed *Jeroboam* for *Solomon's* Idolatry.

However, our great Master born King of the World, acknowledgeth himself in his Humanity born a Subject to *Augustus*, and *Tiberius*, and doth a Miracle to pay a Tribute, and gives to *Cæsar* the things that are *Cæsar's*, (outward Obedience and Observance in Matters of a secular and indifferent Nature) and acknowledges the Power of *Pontius Pilate* over his Life. He will not call for the Legions of Angels, he could, to defend him; nor do his Apostles tread in other steps, or teach other Doctrine. Yet doth not all this Security  
author

authorize a Prince to be arbitrary or tyrannous, for God proclaims himself an Avenger, nor doth his Word afford such Princes any other appellation than that of a Bear, or of a Lion.

When *Nebuchadnezzar* would have his Golden Image worship'd, what is the Answer? Not, let us resist, *but pardon us in this, O King! Non est nostri juris peccare, pati est*; It is not in our power to sin, it is to suffer.

Now Princes in the State of Sovereignty (as our Prince in Parliament) are said to be above the Laws, because they may change, abrogate, and dispense with them, not because when it pleases them, they may violate them. If they judge the Change conduces unto publick good, they are superiour to the Laws; but if they remove a Law, to satisfy a Passion, or to take off a Restraint from themselves, or like *Nebuchadnezzar* will be deifying themselves, they may punish their Subjects for not obeying those Laws, but God will punish them for abuse of their Office, and other Remedy the Subjects by the Law of God have none; but by the false Reasonings of a *Junius Brutus*, and of a *Buchanan* they have many. So as Subjects adventure not only their Peace, but their Salvation for their Rebellion. Rebellion is not a single Sin, but a Complication of Sins, it disquiets a whole Nation, makes great thoughts of Heart; no Man sits under his own Vine, it involves the Innocent in the Misery, though not in the Guilt, and tyrannizes over such, over whom they have no just Power, or Right. The Ship Money determined by Law (though probably with all its Circumstances not warranted so) was far from a Justification of Arms; but rather than endure a Monopoly; or a Loan, a Civil War must give License for plunder unto the Soldiers of both Partiss, under so Christian a King as *Charles* the First was. Had his two Houses been of the same Temper with him,

or had they not had a malicious and short-sighted Policy, to alter the whole Frame of Government, how easily both before the War was begun, and after the Sword was bloued, might they have compos'd all things suitable to God's Laws, and the Laws of the Nation. But these Men made themselves Slaves to their Slaves, because they would not be loyal Subjects to their Prince. It is one thing for a Senate (and certainly an honest one, and a dutiful one) to represent Grievances, and to withhold Supplies upon no redress of Grievances; but there is nothing of a Grievance properly, which violates no Law in being, but it is Rebellion to take up Arms upon such Pretences.

*How heinous it is to we see both their Doctrines differed not from what a People to right Reason truly makes Policy; for observe, affect a new whether the Grecians casting off the Tyranny of Form of Government. Monarchy, or undermining an Aristocracy, to set up a Democracy, or supplanting that with an Oligarchy, or casting off all these for a Select 410, or an Usurping 30. Tyrants bettered their Condition, or whether it was not more fatal to them than the Arbitrariness of any One, or any few select Persons.*

As *Moses* and Christ taught this Subjection, so we see both their Doctrines differed not from what right Reason truly makes Policy; for observe, whether the *Grecians* casting off the Tyranny of Monarchy, or undermining an Aristocracy, to set up a Democracy, or supplanting that with an Oligarchy, or casting off all these for a Select 410, or an Usurping 30. Tyrants bettered their Condition, or whether it was not more fatal to them than the Arbitrariness of any One, or any few select Persons.

Hence Reason, *Moses* and Christ, must needs have prevailed with the Apostles, rather to endure the Tyranny of the worst of Princes, under whom they lived (even *Nero*) than have quitted their sound Doctrine; *Let every Soul be subject to the higher Powers.*

*How loyal the Primitive Christians were.*

And as the Apostles did, so did their Successors, the primitive Bishops, who willingly became Martyrs rather than Rebels. He that would satisfy himself herein, let him but read *Tertullian's* Apology, and he will find, it was not Weakness, or want of Courage, but strength of Faith, that kept the Primitive Christians quiet under the Persecution of the most bloody Heathen Emperors.

But we have lived to read *Pseudo* or false Teachers,

chers, that make the Doctrine of Resistance a new Light, which Light is a Light that leads to Darkness, setting up the Passions of the Multitude, to be their own Guides, and their own Ruin.

Our great Adversary the present Church of Rome, contrary to St. Paul's Doctrine to the same, Rom, 13. makes Princes hold their Scepter, and Subjects their Allegiance of her; and the Scotch Presbytery with their Lay Interpreter Buchanan *The Romish Doctrine about Subjection.* *de Jure Regni apud Scotos, and Junius Brutus* subject Princes to the People (for which there is as much warrant in Scripture for Presbyters to lord it over Princes, as for the Pope.) and so these Serpents casting their Tails into their Mouths make Extremes meet.

But judicious Calvin, however byass'd, was convinced by Scripture of the Unreasonableness of such Doctrine, therefore about the latter end of his Institutions, he determines against Resistance of Sovereign Princes, though he leaves this Gap in a strong Hedge, limiting what he had laid down rather to every single Man in a State, than to such Orders of Men, as he called the States of a Kingdom; for unto these he will neither give warrant, because in no Christian State now are there such a Constitution, as were those of the *Demarchi, Ephori*, or Tribunes of the People in *Athens, Sparta, and Rome*, nor doth he make a Resolution against them.

Luther, who when the Boors, or Peasants in Germany were tumultuously reforming themselves, and casting off their Prince's Authority, he disclaims their Proceedings. I have ever, says he, from the beginning taught Subjection, and abhorred all Sedition, exhorted to Obedience to the higher Powers; yea even to bear with Tyranny, and wicked Government; though I perceive, says he, the War is managed on both sides with an evil Conscience, as Governours to settle Tyranny, and

E

People

People to gain their Desires by Sedition. Yet even this happy Instrument of Reformation made this faint Reply to some Lawyers, who press'd upon him, that the Laws of the Nation in some Cases permitted of Resistance; that he would not say, that the Gospel did impugn, or dissolve, or abolish the politick Laws of a Land. Which certainly it doth not, for the Gospel at the same time obliges the King, when it restrains the Subject from Resistance, but still it warrants no Resistance.

Whilst the Church of *England*, with *Moses*, Christ, the Apostles, and the primitive Church, countenances no Tyranny in the Prince, nor allows any Resistance in the Subject, nor recommends any stupid Insensibility to them; for she allows their orderly, and not terrifying way of petitioning. Nay in the Courts, and before the Judges appointed for it, she bids them defend themselves, she bids them not give up their Rights, but she forbids them to maintain it by force. She secures not the Prince, the Subject will not rise against him, since God being singly, and properly his Revenger may, and often doth make the Subject's Disloyalty his Rod for Tyranny, and so as both offend, he will punish both, *viz.* the one by the other. This Church, with what sound Reason (on which all sound Politicks are built) and what our own Laws assert. resolves, That all single Persons are forbid Resistance; and then farther resolves, That all Orders or States of Men in a politick Body, be the Government Monarchical, or Aristocratical, &c. are but as single Men in respect of the Head, or Sovereign Powers, for even these in respect of him, or them are to be reputed, even in the politick Body, but as single, or private Men, and so no more can resist the Sovereign Person, or Persons, than a private Man. This I believe to be Apostolick Doctrine, and this the Recognitions made to our own Kings in Acts of Parliament warrant us to say. Go-

Government examined by the Law of the Land.

If this be the Nature of Government in general, *What the* and of Sovereign Persons, to whom Government *Law of En-* is intrusted, let us in the next place examine, how *gland re-* the Law of this our own Nation determines the *quires.* Case.

We all know our Government is a mixt Mo- *The King* narchy; and yet by all Foreigners, as *Bodin, Gro-* of England *an absolute,* *though not* *an arbitrary* *Monarch.* *tius* and others, it is reputed an absolute Monarchy; for Limitations which transfer not the Power unto any other, but require only the Consent of some other, divest it not of the Title of Monarchy, or of the King's being an absolute though not an Arbitrary Monarch.

Our Laws say then,

All Persons are under the King, and the King *Axioms of* under none. *Law.*

Or, *Omnis sub Rege, & ipse sub nullo.*

He hath not any Peer in his Kingdom, nor any superiour, but God.

Or, *Satis ei erit, quod Dominum habet ultorem.*

Then no Judge over him.

Allegiance is to be sworn to him, and Homage, *Allegiance* not only by every single Person through the King- *sworn to him* dom, but by every single Member of his two *not only by* Houses of Parliament; for not one of them can sit *single Men* there, before he hath taken the Oaths of Allegi- *but by the* *three E-* *states,* *ance* and Supremacy, and he that reads either of these Oaths, needs not seek where the Sovereignty is lodged. And though these Oaths were formed principally, to disclaim Papal Jurisdiction, yet that abated they are but the old Oaths of Obedience. Nay the three States of Subjects in the Kingdom, *viz.* Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, as a politick Body make the same Recognition. See the Recognitions made to the ancient Kings, even the *Saxons*, and those to

*Henry the VII<sup>th</sup>, Henry the VIII<sup>th</sup>, Queen Elizabeth* and especially to King *James* :

Great, say they in an Act of Parliament, “ Are  
 “ our Blessings by uniting the two ancient Kingdoms,  
 “ or rather the two Imperial Crowns, &c. and up-  
 “ on the Knees of our Hearts we agnize our most  
 “ constant Faith, Obedience, and Loyalty to your  
 “ Majesty and your Royal Progeny : And in this  
 “ high Court of Parliament, where all the Body  
 “ of the Realm, and every particular Member there-  
 “ of either in Person, or by Representation (upon  
 “ their own Elections) are by the Laws of this  
 “ Realm deemed to be personally present.

Sir *Edward Coke* observes by the Laws of King *Alfred*, as well as by those of the Conqueror, the ancient Kings, who were *Saxons*, had all the Lands of *England* in *Demesnes* (*Instit. Fol. 58.*) and the Barons, or Lords of Mannors were enfeoffed by the Conqueror with all, which the King held not, but they held it for Defence of the Realm under the King, and consequently they were, to defend it, and support it in time of Danger. The King was the Grand Lord, or Lord Paramount, and the Nobility and Gentry but the mean Lords, and all the rest held in Vassallage under him or them. Freeholders came in by the Nobilities ill Husbandry, and by their selling Part of their Land and enfranchising it. But still the Land was held by some Tenure, which obliged the Owner, Lord, or Commoner, more or less (as in Capite or Free Socage after the Conquest) for the Defence of the Land, for indeed that is the Ground Work of all Society; for every Man is naturally bound, with his Ability, to defend the Politick Body, and the Constitution of the Government, though the *Quotum*, and manner of the raising it, had the Subjects Consent, that it might be the more equally laid, and the more cheerfully paid

paid, and the more orderly levied, and as an Evidence that the Government was not despotical, but the People free, and yet thus far under Subjection.

The raising of Money or Taxes is one of those particulars, wherein our Monarch is limited; for he cannot raise Money upon the Subject, but by his Commons, and with the Consent of the Lords, or by Concurrence of them both: yet the Commons can raise no Money, but to give unto the King, or as the King accepts it for such an Use, which is Conviction enough, that all the Taxes of the long Parliament were illegal and their Power an Usurpation.

*The Limitation of the King's Prerogative.*

Many other Instances there are of the King's single Supremacy, but without mentioning more (for all are embowell'd in these few) we will conclude with Sir *Henry Spelman's* Assertion in his *Glossary*, *Omnis Regni Justitia solius Regis est*: All the Justice of the Kingdom is of the King alone.

In the next Place, we will consider him in a Parliament, and here his Prerogative is unlimited, or he is in his Zenith, or he is entirely Sovereign; for here the Purse and the Sword are joined together. Here, with Consent of the Lords and Commons, he makes what Laws he finds necessary for the Publick-Weal. The two great Cases, wherein Monarchical Prerogative is limited, concern our Lives and Liberties which are secured to Subjects, by the common and Statute Laws of the Realm; for we are a free People, or we know the Law we walk by; and yet in Parliament (in matters wherein the publick Safety is concerned, or the Prince's Person) a new Law may declare that a Treason, which before the new Law was not so. But Complication of Acts, which were known before and acknowledged of an inferiour Species to Treason before the making such a Law, cannot be made Treason, by that Law, though the Person for them may suffer as a Traitor, but

*The Monarchy absolute in Parliament.*

not by the great Act of Treason, which says, nothing should be accounted Treason, which was not therein particularly named; yet all this Caution was, to exclude inferiour Courts from so denominating it, but not the King in Parliament. Indeed here Prerogative is unlimited, because here whatever is determined, may justly be supposed well weighed, and so provided that it may not in-rench upon Liberty in general, though for Example sake it fall severe on an individual Person. But if a Prince be here importuned, nay violated, or his Houses Advices be prest upon him by Rabbles or Multitudes of *Plebeians*, this is as great a Crime in that Body towards him, as any Fact could be in the Person thus brought to Judgment because of the Danger in its Precedent, since a Prince may as well force the Consent of his two Houses by an Army, to declare whom he pleases a Traytor, as they can him by Multitudes and Numbers of the meanest Tradesmen, to make Laws of any kind. This was a Case, which God grant may never be drawn into Example; for our Judicious Historian *Daniel* says, “Where the Prince  
“and States of a Kingdom watch the Necessities of  
“each other, that they may obtain their several  
“ends, and make Advantages; the true Interest of  
“the Nation is lost, and as this Proceeding is un-  
“just, and not sincere, so it is ever unsuccessful,  
The Prætors Ediēt says, *Quod vi factum est, ratum non habebō*: What is done by force I will not have confirmed. And *Bartolus* says, *Spiritus Sanctus posuit hæc Verba in Ore Prætoris*: The Holy Ghost put these Words into the Mouth of the Prætor.

Parliaments are called by the King's Writ, and are adjourned, prorogued, or dissolved at the King's Pleasure, and his Death dissolves them, without any farther Signification, which shews, how entirely they depend on his Sovereignty, and on his Person.

No Member of it hath Privilege of Parliamen-  
ment

ment for Treason, Felony or Breach of Peace.

The two Houses are to act suitably to the Call of his Writ: The Commons are called *ad faciendum*, or *consentiendum*, or to perform or consent: The Nobles to treat and give Council, or *Colloquium & Tractatum habere*, and they are called, not for all, but for some (or such of his Affairs as he pleases, to communicate to them) though when they meet, they have Liberty, to represent any Grievance, which properly is a Violation of any Law; for that cannot properly be called a Grievance, which is no Breach of a Law in being, and here likewise they represent, what they suppose, would tend to the publick Utility, submitting it still to the Royal Pleasure: In a Word, the Houses may propose, but it is the King that determines; for he accepts or rejects, and what he accepts is only a Law, and his Law only; for his Houses pray a Law, but he enacts it; for Authority must be single, and therefore our Laws call him the Beginning, Head, and End of a Parliament, which surely excludes all Pretence to Co-ordination.

It is never called the High Court of Parliament but with reference to his Royal Presence. It is true, it is the highest Court of Judicature, because hither Men may appeal from all inferiour Courts of *Westminster-Hall*; but whether here they may begin original Process, is inquirable. In this sense it is called the Court of Parliament, but not the High Court of Parliament; for the Lords House is a Court of Record, and can administer Oaths, and Fine, &c. And it is called the Court of Parliament, when the Lords and Commons join in an Order, but thus never to the House of Commons singly; for they can administer no Oath, nor Fine, nor Imprison, but their own Members; or they may for Violation of their own Privileges commit to their own Serjeant a Foreigner, who hath violated their Privileges. This is said, not to diminish

minish their ancient and just Jurisdictions, nor to lessen the great Use of them, but to keep each Court within its Bounds, which is truly to preserve the general Peace, and Welfare of the Nation.

In this High Court of Parliament, the King meets with his three States of the Realm, that is to say, with the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and the Commons.

*The necessity of a good Intelligence betwixt the King and his two Houses of Parliament.*

To have Intelligence with this Body of Men, surely is one of the greatest Policies a Prince can shew; for by them, he is best represented unto his People. The Supplies they give him, are best payed, when granted by them. Here appears the good Constitution of Government, or that harmonious Justice (as *Bodin* calls it) of a State, where every Order of Men see themselves represented, as Members of the politick Body, or have a Value put on them, or thus, they are not excluded from having an Interest in the State. These are the Men, who walk the Perambulations of the Government, and part of whose Charge it is, to keep the true and old Boundaries, and Land-marks of the State, and not set up new, or who are to guard Prerogative, Privilege and Liberty, so as none of them intrench upon the other; for Subjects wound themselves as much, as they do their Prince, when they invade his Prerogatives.

*The Choice of Parliament Men.*

Persons therefore sent, as the Peoples Representatives, ought, to be chosen out of that Number of Men, which understand, and love the Government settled, or (as *Aristotle* says) *Ut ea pars sit potior, quæ Rempublicam sanam esse vellet, quam ea, quæ nollit*, or that that sort of Men who desire the Safety of the Commonwealth should be regarded before those that do not. Who affect not Changes, or who are not popular Orators with ambitious Hearts, designing Heads, and smooth Tongues, and who would be *Ephori*, *Curatores*, or Tribunes, or King

Controul.

*Controulers*, who are apt to propose violent Remedies, or make Physick more pernicious than the Disease; of whom it may be said, as was said of *Sylla*, *Patriam durioribus remediis, quam pericula erant, sanavit*, That he had cur'd his Country by Remedies more sharp than the danger of the Disease. Such Men as these are apter to make remonstrances to the People, than reasonable representations to a Prince. And our late History of *Charles* the First will shew their Temper, for they (even when they were victorious over the King) upon the Stairs of their own Senate-House, wounded and bruised by their Soldiers many of their Fellow-Subjects, and those who lived in their own Quarters, for no other reason, than that they petitioned them to make Peace with the King. Examine their own Records, what Prerogatives these Men used over their Fellow-Subjects, and there will be little occasion to complain of the Cruelty of any of the *English* Princes. They that teach a Multitude to resort to their own Strength against their Prince, will live (as *London* did) to see their own Cannon, or Ordinance by their own Army turn'd upon themselves, which they mounted to keep out their Prince. But this sad Example terrifies neither side: not the one from Occasions of Jealousy about Religion, and properly, nor the other from entertaining again the Spirit of Schism and Rebellion. But arise, O Lord, and compose our Distractions. Thus if you ask, what is a wise Man, or a People without Liberty, or *Quid Cato sine Libertate?* You may live to answer, what's Liberty without a *Cato*? Or, *Quid Libertas sine Catone?* *Tacitus* makes mention of a Sect, who brought forth the *Tuberones* and the *Favonians* (unpleasing Names to the ancient Common-weal) who to overthrow the State

F

(says

(says he) pretended Liberty ; but if they had overthrown it, they would have given an Assault to have overthrown Liberty likewise. And he commends in another place the good Council of *Sanguinius Maximus*, a Consul, who desired the Senators not to increase the Emperor's Cares by hunting after matters of Dislike. The Wisdom of our Government makes it an Axiome, The King can do no Injury, therefore no Provocation justifies Force against him. His Ministers are answerable to the Laws ; He is exempt, and all this for the Subjects peace. The States of a Land should never represent the Grievances of the Land by Microscopes, for such magnifying Glasses do but exasperate the Humours of the whole Body, and discourage the Prince from giving Remedies : for when a Prince discerns a willingness in such a body, not to misunderstand him, it is the best way to procure a good Understanding with him. Wise Men should reflect on the unavoidable Errors or Disorders in their own Families, before they should aggravate or lay too naked (especially to those that cannot cure them) the Failures of a Government. Nor is it excuse for these Zealot-States-Men to say, they act with good Intentions to the Publick ; for mistakes of Judgment may plead both with God and Man for a mitigation of the Punishment of an Offence, but never for the Justification of an Evil, or illegal Act. Thus Nations are often overthrown by Impatience ; so dangerous is an over-doing Reformation. But a wise Senate makes a happy People and a glorious Prince, by considering States

*Enemies to* like as they do Men, or that they are best, not  
*the Form of* who have no failures, but who have fewest.

*Government, rather than*  
*the Governours.*

There are times when Men are more willing to cast off the Form of Government, than the Governours, and such designs are with most difficulty withstood.

Thus

Thus we see, Government (or rather the Justice of it) is founded upon the Law of Nature, secured by the Word of God, and defended by the Laws of the Land. But we have a great Apostle of this Age, or a learned, and strong presumptuous *Leviathan*, who not founding it upon Nature, makes it arise from Necessity, and Fear; thus he makes the Government, and the Governours rather the Brat of a miserable, and frightened People, than the Ordinance of God, so weakning the Nature, or Original of Government, and yet one while making the Governour such a *Leviathan*, no single Person, or Body of Men is to resist him; for he so exalts him, that he may set up what Idol, or vain Opinions he will, for a Religion, and all his Subjects are bound to entertain it, and no other, and no Man upon any Occasion, to rise against him; and yet at last if they do resist and prevail, he finds means to justify them. Thus he can blow hot, and cold, and we must all submit to his Dogma's, or be a foolish Generation. But so many good Pens have made Remarks upon him, that were it not, to frame a little Scheme, principally for my self, I would not meddle with him at all.

His Arguments run thus: *Government arose upon necessity, and upon the Fear one Man had of another's Power, every Man by Birth having an equal Right unto every thing*: so the natural Condition of Mankind was a state of War, or Hostility with one another. Now this is very strange, that this learned Man should not consider, if Wolves and Vultures (the fiercest Beasts, and Birds of Prey) will not act thus upon their own kind, if Nature (which we may believe, is this Gentleman's God) framed these wild Creatures calm to one another, how she should come to be such a Step-dame to Mankind? And if this Gentleman

*Government how grounded.*

*Mr. Hobbs considered.*

*How Mr. Hobbs makes the Passions, and not the moral Vertues, the foundation of Government.*

proves Man's Soul endued with moral Vertues as well as natural Passions, why should he make Government arise from the Concupiscible Passion of Desire, and the Irascible of Fear, and not from the Cardinal Vertues of Prudence, Temperance, Justice, and Fortitude with Humanity and Veracity? Do not these moral Vertues evidence, Men were created, not only for a harmless, but a beneficial Society? And doth not the necessity Man hath of help in relation to his body, shew, he was not fram'd to live alone? And in relation to his mind, doth not Temperance restrain Desire, and Fortitude repress Fear? How doth Temperance fit him to be contented with a little, and so make needless the invading the Rights of others? How doth Justice regulate his Actions towards other Men, and so secure them from any Violence from him? How doth Humanity make him apt to relieve anothers Necessities, as Justice did to preserve his Rights? How doth his Veracity secure another in his Conversation with him? Nor did Art, or Policy, beget these Vertues in Mankind, or Nature, but a God of Nature implanted them, in Human Nature; and can this Gentleman believe the Disorders, that flowed from Injustice, were the Mother of Justice, though it was often the Mother of good Civil Laws against particularized Acts of Injustice? Injustice wou'd not have been perceived; but as it were a deflection from natural Justice; or why doth he say, Every Man naturally, upon the fear he had of every other Man, was against every other Man, which made it reasonable for every Man to secure himself by way of Anticipation (that is, as I conceive, without any other provocation, or injury, but his own fear) by Force and Wiles to master all others, 'till he saw no other Power great enough to endanger him. His Master *Thucydides* sets forth much

much of this, but allows not the Practice. If this be not prodigy, I know not what is; for if this be true, we will repeat it again, what a Step-mother is Nature (for we will not talk of a God, or an intelligent Mind distinct from, and antecedent to all visible Beings, or of invisible Powers, which seem to him but as Scare crows set up to fright fearful and ignorant Men) who made this kind of Creature Man, miserable by its primitive designation; and yet by, or upon experience of his own Misery, how came Man reasonable enough by Laws and Penalties to find a means lodged in himself to divert the Evil Nature had subjected him unto? Thus the Effect seems superiour to the Cause; for if Man can thus excel his own Nature, how comes it about that other Creatures cannot do the like? Or how comes Man to be wiser by submitting his own Understanding and Strength to a Governour to provide better for himself, than Nature did? Did Nature produce him to a State of War, and he find out the benefit of Society in Peace? Pray then, why should not a Horse do the like, and find he was turn'd out of the Orchard where was long Grass, into the barren Common, for cropping the Trees? Or why should not Bees and Wasps make Leagues together, and one give some of their Honey to avoid Hostility? By all this we see, how fatal it is for Men of strong natural Parts, and good Literature, to entertain false Principles, and how false Principles about Nature produce falser about Policy. Judge *Hales* hath convinced this Gentleman in his Origination of Mankind in point of natural Philosophy, and the Lord Chancellor *Hyde* hath done it as well about his Politicks; and Doctor *Parker*, in his Ecclesiastical Policy, hath shewed the absurdity of this Gentleman's Opinion about Religion, and Civil Policy;

*If Mr. Hobbs his way of stating this Question be true, the Creature is wiser than the Creator.*

Policy; and therefore I'll rather give Men warning of him, than enter farther the Lifts, or I would not farther fall upon one, whom many others have attack'd in so masterly a manner.

God made Government his own Ordinance, and made Governours owe their Authority to him; for it is by him that Princes reign; for Promotion neither comes from the East, nor from the West, for it is God that sets up one, and pulls down another. He cloathed them with Power and Majesty, as the necessary Supports of all Government; for without these no Personal Vertues of the Prince would be able to support him, or with a heady, and mistaking Multitude to give that Obedience, which Government cannot want.

*God vested  
Government  
with Power  
and Maje-  
sty.*

*Power.*

Power therefore is singly lodged in him (or them) in whom the Sovereignty is lodged; and if there be no Sovereignty, or a Power from which there is no Appeal, there is no Government, for the Rights of Sovereignty must be uncontrollable; for if God were not omnipotent, Men would not be guided by his Wisdom; for we see Men questioning his Decrees every day not content with his Justice; for how many dishonour his Determination of not resisting evil Governours, though it were made in behalf of themselves, as the best means to secure their common Peace, and publick Interest? A great part of the Office of a Governour is to reward and punish; yet herein if Power fenced it not, every one would share with his Prince, or dispense these themselves, and become Judges, or give Sentence (nay Executioners too) in their own Cases. Where Rewards and Punishments are not well dispens'd, Loyalty and Faithfulness will both quit a Court. And *Boccalini* makes those Vertues rather to retire to a Dog kennel, than return thither; for the Creature (says he) hath some gratitude and sense  
of

of being well used, and therefore these Virtues quitted the Court, and went thither. (Thus the dispensing Rewards, and Punishments being so eminent a Branch of a Prince's Power, he should trust it in no hand, to distribute them, but his own. All Natures (but God's) wanting somewhat, are moved or attracted by Rewards, and deterred by Punishments. For Punishments, were added unto Laws, that whom Conscience would not restrain, present Pain, and loss might.

Majesty is the Glory of Power reflected, or it *Majesty* is a Result of the amplitude of Greatness directed to bring Awe and Reverence towards Authority; for Majesty is but a seeming pageantry, when Power upholds it not, and where every one can approach it without respect; for says the Politician *Majestas major è Longinquo*; Majesty appears greater from afar for when a Prince, by some unseemingly Familiarity of some Favourite, abates, or lets fall his own Majesty, every one that thinks as well of himself, as the Prince doth of the Favourite, forgets his Duty, and becomes sawcy. And thus when a Prince abates of the Reverence, which ought to be paid to his Person, he seldom finds it paid unto his Affairs. It's good for a Prince by a Reputation of Mildness, lodg'd in him rather by his Discretion, than natural Temper, to abate in his Subjects in general the Fear of his Power; for that will be thought the juster, when he is sharp upon a particular Man, that demerits; but to let fall his Majesty, warrants low Thoughts of him among the generality. Thus Princes, though as Men they must live as Men, yet by reason of the Dignity of their Office, they must either abstain from, or use these Familiarities in private, or be prejudiced

in their Regal Station; and the Person to whom the Prince communicates these Favours, if he be either vain, or insolent upon them (which is a hard task, not to be) he draws upon himself an insupportable Envy, and a great Diminution upon his Master's Reputation.

*The Prince the true representative of a Nation.* The full Glory of a Nation (or its Majesty) is drawn, as in a Burning-Glass, into one point in the Person of the King; and therefore if he let it fall himself, or any Subject, by abuse of his Favour, darken it, it's an Offence against the Publick.

*How his Power, and how his Majesty, are both necessary.* The Office of a King, or Supreme Governors, is to govern Multitudes of People, and they are heady, refractory and unsteady, like Horses apt to be resty, without they find their Riders fast in the Saddle, and themselves commanded by the Bit, and Spur, or under a Power, and thus Power is necessary. And Common People, like Children, are delighted with Glorious and Gay Things, and thus Majesty is necessary; so as the reverence of Civil Government is upheld much by the Splendour of Majesty. For without this, popular Fancy will not be pleas'd, nor satisfy'd, for which reason Greatness ever stands in need of some sensible Lustre. Thus as there is a real necessity of Power, so, considering how strong Fancy is in Multitudes, there is a necessity, Majesty be as little neglected, as Power.

*The personal Virtues of a Prince.* Power and Majesty are the two great Supports of Sovereignty, but are best upheld by two Personal Virtues, *viz*, that of Piety, and that of Justice.

*Piety.* Piety leads a Prince to believe, he is accountable unto God for the Administration of his High Office, and it leads the Subject to believe, that that Prince, who acknowledges a greater

Power

Power than his own, and *that* that a *Divine* Power, is like to use his own unto good Ends ; It bows his own Heart unto God, and his Subjects unto himself ; or it disposes him to live well, and his Subjects to obey willingly. It makes him watchful in the discharge of his own Office, and resolute against those that invade him in it. It is the best directress both of his Power, and Majesty ; for it keeps Power from Cruelty, and Majesty from disdain of others. It makes a Prince value the Divine Providence, that watches over him more than his Guards ; knowing without this, Civil Wisdom, or Military Power very often miscarry. Indeed the Vices of Princes always turn to their own Punishment. For they that imitate them in their Vice, are aptest to disquiet them in their Government, and thus they dishearten good Subjects, to uphold them, and encourage ill, to rebel against themselves.

Justice as it flows from Piety, so it is upheld *Justice.* by Power. Justice must appear, or be known, to be armed, or it is too like to be disputed in its Execution. Men entred into Society, that they might enjoy the Benefit of it, and when it is obstructed, a Commonwealth is sick ; if generally it be not administred, the Band of Society is dissolved ; the Execution of it is the Life of the Laws. No Arbitrary Power, or Decision, or Reason of State must want Justice ; for the standing Laws, and the Arbitrary Determinations of Sovereignty must both be reasonable and just ; the one may decline the Formalities, or Forms of Process, which the other is tied unto, but justice must be the Life and Spirit of them both, and therefore they have narrow Thoughts, that think what is Arbitrary is Unjust ; for when it is the determination of a good, and a wise Man, it's very often more perfect, than the Law it self,  
G because

because made a Rule, after the inconvenience of the Law is perceived, or wise Men would make it a Law, or give it a Sanction as soon as proposed. So as I ever thought, the binding the Judges, or their binding themselves too strictly unto the Letter of the Law, and Formality of Words, and spellings in Pleadings, was like strait Ligatures, which hinder just Circulation of Humours; for it is one thing to leave the Judge too loose, but its another (more nocent) to tie him up too strait: this sets up distinct Courts of Equity, and that multiplies Suits, and many other Inconveniences. Keep an ill, or corrupt Man from being a Judge; soon remove him, when it is perceived, nay severely punish, but pinion him not so, as he must sit and see the Craft of a Solicitor or an Attorney evade the true meaning of the Law. In such a Case let him (as well as the Party pinch'd by the Subtilty of the Plea) have a liberty to put the Case to a summary Decision of all the Benches, which he finds not fit to determine in his own Court.

*Est. by J. R.*

Faithfulness in a Prince is but a part of his Justice; *Lying Lips* (says *Solomon*) *become not a Prince*; and the reason is, that he that hath a generous Heart will not stand in need of a false Mouth. A Prince ought to be clothed with Reputation, which no Man inwardly can render to him, on whom he cannot depend, or whose Word he cannot rely on.

But because necessarily there must be granted unto Men in Civil Affairs, and in Kingly Policies, a greater Latitude than ought to be allowed in common Conversation, not of dealing falsely, but demeaning a Mans self sagaciously: therefore Princes, and Ambassadors, who know, what weights are used, seldom expect other Coin, than that which is mixt with an Allay, which though  
it

it debaseth the Mettal, yet makes it work the better. Chancellor *Bacon* distinguishes well betwixt Simulation, and Dissimulation (indeed the distinction is *Cicero's*, in his Offices, *lib. 3.*) making the first but an Art of State, or an Art of Life, as *Tacitus* calls it an Art of living among Men, that dissemble, The other a false Profession, by which (I think) he means Falstity, when he professes Sincerity: which surely is a false Policy, and no ways allowable; the first he assigns unto *Augustus*, the second unto *Tiberius*. The first is but the Art of a well managed Horse, who observing the Hand knows how to stop on a suddain. Undoubtedly when a Prince believes he is clearly dealt with, he should be as clear in his dealing: For tho' their Condition exempts them from that openness, and round Dealing, which is the honour of a private Man's Nature, yet the importance of their Obligations reaching unto the Good or Harm of so many private Men, they are admitted to have more of the Serpentine Windings, than would become a private Man. Equivocations must necessarily be dis-allowed by all Men in Treaties; but Reservedness in Speech, or Diversion in Discourse, which otherwise would disclose a meaning too soon: A speaking that for his own Opinion, which he avers, not to be his Master's Instruction: a subtilty of extracting the others thoughts, and yet concealing his own: to be cautious in the beginning of a Treaty, so he be sincere and open in the Conclusion of it: All these are seemly in an Ambassador, which would be very blameable among private Men, especially Friends. "The best Composition, says a great Man, is Openness in Fame, Secrecy in Habit; for Nakedness, says he, as little becomes a Mind, as a Body. Histories, and Civilians give greater Latitude unto Princes, to discharge themselves

*How Em-  
bassadors  
ought to  
manage  
themselves  
in Treaties.*

selves of the Obligation of their Treaties, than exact Morality will allow of. I remember several Instances in Dr. *Zouch*, and particularly of Queen *Elizabeth*, who said plainly, she meant sincerely, when she treated; but having promised an Assistance farther than would stand with her own Treasure, and her Peoples Safety, she could not bind her self to the extremity of her Articles; She was ready to shew, she meant not in her Treaty, to deceive; nor did she then intend to bear the ill Consequences, which she now discerned.

*Clemency.*

Clemency is a chief part of Humanity, and should ever be found in a Prince; because most Men at one time or another, stand in need of a Prince's Goodness. But to make it valuable, this Virtue should proceed from Generosity, not Facility of his Nature; and he must be careful, that neither his natural good Temper, nor his moral Clemency appear, to take off the Terror of his political Justice. His Clemency will sufficiently appear, if it restrain him from frequent Severities; for it is neither for the Honour of the Prince, nor of the Physician, when their Patients are sent in numbers to the burial Places. Clemency withstands not Severity, though she endeavours to use it seldom; for a Prince may be very clement in his Disposition, nay in his Judgment and usual Practice, and yet be very severe upon Provocations that warrant the same; for such a well used Severity the better illustrates his Clemency. But it is much better for a Prince to pardon an Offence against his Person, than against his Government, or against a private Subjects Interest, or Right: And nothing can worse become a Prince's Bounty, or Clemency, than to grant Pardons to Offenders, as Donatives or Rewards to Servants. It is much better to give them the Forfeiture of an Offender's Estate, for that is an Escheat to himself;

himself, than a Pardon to an Offender, for that is selling of Justice. A Pardon is either not fit to be given at all, or to be done freely, that so it may be a real Act of Clemency, and make the Offender grateful, or upon a second Fault more guilty.

Modesty is a Virtue of so mean a sound, that it *Modesty.* may seem derogatory to attribute it to a Prince; but if well interpreted, it is a Flower in his Crown; for it is a high-spirited Virtue, tempering Greatness, or Power towards Men of inferior Condition; or it is a generous disposition in a Prince, not to dazle a private Man with the Glory of his Majesty, nor to create in him Fear by the Terror of his Power: so it must needs be attractive both of Love and Reverence, rendring the Prince accessible, and making him unapt to put a Neglect, or Affront upon the meanest Man, since the meanest may do the greatest a shrewd turn, for *Nil tam firmum est, cui periculum non sit, etiam ab invalido.*

Besides, Modesty is a great Antidote against Flattery, the common bane of Princes, and the Flattery that is made unto their Business and Affairs, is often greater and more pernicious than that which is made unto their Persons: for the one is but scratching an Itch of a prurient Temper or Blood, but the other is endangering the Publick Peace or Security. Flattery of a Prince's Person is but like a painted Flower that pleases the Eye, but offends the Smell; but Flattery of his Business is like a chymical Vapour, that stupifies the Brain. But in both kinds Princes love to draw it upon themselves; for such as seem to admire their Persons, and applaud or concur in their Councils, they take to be their Friends; and the Reason of it is, they love rather to have their Hopes fortified, than their Dangers awak'd, for they affect to cherish Hope and stifle Fear, and  
are

are not patient of deliberating or examining a matter by contrary Judgments, or Men of several Conceptions, or divers Tempers, Educations, or Interests; For opposite Opinions are like the Teeth of a File, it must scrape off before it can smoothe an Affair, whilst several concurring Judgments too often make an Affair pleasant and hopeful in the beginning, though more commonly irksome and shameful at the latter end of it. *Xerxes* never knew the value of his Councillor *Demaxatus*, until he had made his shameful retreat out of *Greece*; then he found what the other had told him, that there was much difference between a great Multitude and a well disciplin'd Army, whether it were to fight, or to subsist: and then he knew the Accidents that attended upon the one in marching through *Straights*, and finding Provision, and the usefulness and services of the other. And for the honour of this King it is, that he valued this single Man more than he did all his other Councillors when returned home. But when Observations of this kind are never so much multiplyed, Princes Courts will never be cured of this King's Evil, but they will favour those, who Counsel towards what they love; and never have in Esteem those, who by projecting the worst, and foreseeing ill Consequences, or cautioning against Dangers, evidence they love their Master's Honour and Success in Affairs better than they do their own Preferments: for Flattery is the best Court-pick-lock, and plainness of Speech the surest bar against a Man's own Preferment. Modesty hath this farther good operation upon a Prince, that it minds him of the incertainty of Events in the best laid and prosecuted Designs, there being a common Vicissitude or change of Fortune, which wise Men (like *Porus*) will discern and laugh at even in  
their

their Captivity, because thereby they discern, *Quam caduca sit Felicitas humana*, as *Curtius* expresses it, or how fading and falling a Lease Prosperity is.

Liberality, or Bounty is much cried up in a *Liberality*. Prince, and is very becoming Greatness and Majesty; for Men would not love the Sun, or Heavenly Bodies for their own Glory and Heat, if they conveyed not unto them, and other Creatures cheering Light, and benign Influences. But it requires Prudence in a high measure to guide it; for if it run into the intrinsic Estate of a Prince, or make him poor, that others may be vainly rich, it discredits him more, than it honours him, and loses its name, for it is termed prodigality. Even he that is benefited by it, despises him for it, looking rather on it as a weakness, than a greatness of mind; and it obliges unto no thankfulness, if what is loosely or inconsiderately given obliges to such Expences, or splendid course of life (which some Princes affect from those they are thus bountiful unto) that they can lay up nothing for themselves and Children: Money being like Meat, if a Man must eat or swallow till he regorge it, he will find a Philosopher's Supper better than a Prince's Feast. If Favourites of Pleasure be the Objects of Bounty, then the Subjects shut the purse from supplying him, who feeds so many Vermine, and on whom such Vermine hang; let their Food be never so good, the Mien or Countenance never is florid. Or if excessive Bounty unto some few make Servants lose their small Pensions, Wages, or Diets, it aliens the Affections, and chills the Duty of those many other Attendants towards the Master. Indeed Bounty to such Men should be only waste Water; when the Exchequer can supply the ordinary Expences, Bounty is then, and not until then

then seemly; nor should Bounty unto Favourites, or Expences of Pleasure deprive deserving Servants, or Subjects, of Rewards, such as have merited of the State in home or foreign Affairs, for to these a Prince may laudibly appear rather poor than not bountiful; yet for these he must not weaken the publick Revenue, which in all Nations is reputed sacred; but the casual Revenue, and the Offices in the Gift of the Crown, the Leases even of the Demesns, and things of this Nature are wisely here disposed. But in giving Honours and Estates in Perpetuity, if any one made his Reflections, how many noble Families owed both to the Crown, and yet in this last Age have contributed much to pull it down, one would put no great price upon Gratitude, or Princes might well think it fit to put some new Rules unto their Bounties. Rewards unto some Persons, which far exceed the Merit of the Person, make others much undervalue what they receive, though they receive with an over-measure: and if their Reward come unto them more from the Interposition of a great Man, than the Prince's own Disposition, the former will have the thanks; and thus a Prince buys but a Servant for a great Man. Sir *Dudley Diggs* in his Preface unto Secretary *Walsingham's* Letters observes, that Queen *Elizabeth* was better served for a Pension of 40 *l.* per Annum, than King *James* for an Annuity of 400 *l.*

*Frugality.*

Frugality in a Prince is an universal Bounty to all his People, for it enables a Prince to live without, or at least to crave less Aids; and a Prince's care to promote Trade, Manufactures, Husbandry, &c, or prevent Confederacy among Men of a Trade, as Graziers, Butchers, &c, or Monopolizers, who set the Price, or Dice (as we call it) upon all Buyers, is to be numbred among

mong Bounties which reach to the whole body of the People. So as the Kingly Office is an Instrument of Bounty and Frugality both, for by one and the same means, he enriches his own People and saves his own Treasure. Men of this Temper are least prest upon, for no Man judges better, when and unto whom it is fit to give, than that Prince that seeks to make his People Rich, rather by his Providence and by their own Industries and Frugalities, than by his Coffers; for it is a very ill Symptome in a State, when every broken Fortune hopes to make it self up from a King's Exchequer. Thus Frugality is a Key unto the Subjects Treasure, for the People willingly lend the Key of theirs unto a Prince that keeps the Lock of his own; and as unwillingly to one who spends upon his Favourites what is his own, or what his Subjects supply him with, since the Humour of such Times and Expences infects the Country as well as the Court, and so they will rail against the Vices that are so costly unto them; and if such an Expensiveness leads towards a general Poverty, it will in a short time draw on a general Defection.

Yet Courts must not want their Splendor, for that is a part of a Prince's Majesty, and the very Silks and fine Linen of it, the back and the board of a few Courtiers feed the Belly, and set on work the hands of many Vulgars. It was observed to be impolitick in the Emperor *Julian* (and accordingly complain'd of, that he affected to appear in his Court more a Philosopher, than a Prince, banishing the Officers of Shews and Vanity, of Cooks, Barbers, and Taylors, &c.

Love of Fame was implanted in Men unto the end they might love Vertue, since there is no greater Evidence, than that where the one is de-  
Love of Fame.

H

spised,

spised, the other is neglected ; for though the Person of a Man in a short time will be forgot, his Deeds with reflection on him will be remembered. Hence it is too many Men will rather wound their Consciences than their Fame, yet many make it the cheapest thing they are concern'd in. Neglect of Fame begets Remissness in Government ; for he that cares little how Men look upon him, cares less what he doth, says that witty, and pleasant, and yet often serious *Spaniard* QUEVEDO. *If Christ himself thought fit to ask his Disciples, what say Men of me ? Nay unto his Apostle St. Peter, what say you of me ? It may become the Wisdom of the greatest Prince to make the same Enquiries.* It is disagreeable unto Nature to be unconcern'd in Fame, since the God or Nature made it a restraint upon a vicious course of life, or a means to keep Men out of bad Company, or out of those courses which expose him to be undervalued ; for not only looseness of Life, but remissness in Affairs, or rash entring upon important Actions, and faintly prosecuting them, or uncertainty of Mind, and unevenness of Counsels (all which usually are attended with unsuccessfulness) draw down Infamy upon a great Man. And when a Prince hath lost the inward Reverence, which is due unto the Generosity of his Mind, the outward, which is paid unto his Person, will soon appear a shadow which forsakes the Dial with the Sun-shine. It is unloosing the Girdle of Government (*solvens Cingulum Regum*) to withdraw an inward esteem from a Prince. Shall Jealousy of a Subject's Reputation awaken a Prince ? Shall he think it his concern, that this Man be not overprized, and yet be unconcerned that he himself is reputed no way valuable ? Since no Men are concerned for a Prince,

Prince they value not, how insecure doth Contempt of Fame render him?

Yet Princes, or Great Men, are not to think a lasting Fame is a good Fame, since the word *famous* is an equivocal word, and Men may be famous for bad as well as good Actions. *Judas* is as well recorded as *St. Peter*; and *Herostratus*, who burnt *Diana's* Temple only to keep up his Name, lost his esteem amongst Men, and had almost lost his Name likewise. *Alexander* the Great, and *Julius Caesar*, and the great and prosperous Neighbour-Prince of our Times affected Fame, but they understood it not, for her Trumpet sounds, and recommends Heroick, Noble, and Vertuous Actions, or Actions that benefited Mankind, not such whose Effects and Prosperity were only like a Storm at Sea, or a plaguy Year, which are registred in the Kalendar for the destruction they made, and the harm they did. How much more hath a private Man to thank God for, that he made him an Instrument of a little Good unto a few Men, than the greatest Prince in the World hath, that he was an universal Pest, and that upon his own choice? The Folly of such a Conceit appears in this, that he thinks he shall preserve the memory of his Person (unto which he is fondly indulgent) by it, when Fame reaches (as that great Man *Boethius* says) no farther than unto his Actions, so as if they be not beautiful and shapely, though he were another *Ab-salom*, Fame will but set him as a Traytor. *Boc-calini* hath a good representation of the Shame and Infamy of black successful Deeds, when he represents Duke *Sforza* of *Milan* demanding a Triumph of *Apollo*, and it being granted him, upon the condition that the Families he had unjustly betray'd, and tyrannically ruined, should

be placed about the Wheels of his Chariot; the Shame thereof cured this Itch of Vanity, and he declined his Triumph, that he might conceal the ways or means that enabled him to pretend to it. This may be a true Reason, why God removed the representations of Mens Persons from Fame, and by it engraved only their Actions; for it was the Vertues of the Mind he took care to recommend to Posterity, and he design'd nothing to be memorable and renowned, but what was fit to be imitated. So as Fame was by God's appointment to preserve the memory of his great and good Deeds, unto whose Person God design'd a Reward from himself in another World, if not in this likewise. And yet a good Fame makes a Man live after his death; for the Honour other Men pay unto his Memory, whose Person they have no notion of, renders him to them as if he were still a living Example of Vertue. The appetite of Honour is rooted even in Nature it self; and therefore if Men be careful how they get it, they may be solicitous to get it, because alive and dead it benefits others as well as themselves, and because it is observable, that those Men who care not what others think of them, care as little what they do themselves.

*Prudence.* Prudence is a Prince's Master-Vertue, indeed it is a private Man's chief Honour: in all Civil, Military, and Ecclesiastical Affairs; it's the great Directress; it weighs all Circumstances, and foresees the most probable Events; for where there is the most of Prudence, there is the least of Chance; for *Summa ratione gesta Fortuna sequitur*, *Fortune follows things concerted with the greatest Reason.*

It is the Distraction of a Man's mind, that he hath so many representations of one and the same thing, like a Picture, if he look upon it by one light it seems one thing unto him, if by another light, it seems to vary its Figure; In it self an Affair may be one thing, but cloathed in its various Circumstances, it's another; so as many ways seem to lead unto it, and yet really there is but one, and this path Prudence only can walk in; for the prudent Man, like the Chymist, can separate Bodies that are mix'd, and incorporate together, and which are indiscernable unto a vulgar Eye. In Civil Affairs he is the best Chymist, who hath most Experience; for though Men may be ingenuous without it, yet seldom solid or expedite, and yet all the Sciences serve him much; for the prudent Prince will stand in need of natural Philosophy to judge of the natural Constitutions and Tempers of Men, as well as moral, to know how to improve, govern, or restrain the Tempers of those whom he intrusts with his Affairs; else an impetuosity of Temper will blind Reason, and transport him, who discerns his own Infirmities, and yet hath not been accustomed to bridle them. An eloquent and designing Man will be followed by Multitudes, when a sober and well-weighting Judgment will too often want a Companion. A prudent Man is apter to suspect his own Advice, than another Man's of whose Integrity he is satisfied, since he may with reason suspect his own Judgment, because every one needs to see his own Thoughts through some other Medium, than his own way of reasoning, the Phancy and the Judgment being too nigh of kin to be severe upon each other; which made *Balsac* determine, that

that it was too often the shame and reproach of human Wisdom, that the greatest Minds being wholly left unto themselves in the greatest Affairs, were likeliest to commit the grossest Errors; and therefore the prudent Man is far from being an overweening, or over-cautious Man: And thus Prudence recommends Modesty.

*Choice of  
Officers.*

Nothing therefore more manifests the Prudence of a Prince, than the Choice of his Counsellors and Subordinate Ministers of State, and Domestick Servants, and Favourites. For the Office of a Prince is well performed in his Person, when he hath chosen good Ministers, and Servants; For thus it hath been said already: He is not the worst Prince, who is the worst Man, but he that hath the worst Instruments to work by, for the Tools usually shew the Artist. For a Prince for Money, or Favour, to bring undeserving Men into Offices of great Trust is to gratify the desires of his Enemies, for they wish nothing more.

*Of Choice of  
Counsellors  
about a  
Prince.*

It is a great Evidence of a Princes own Abilities, to be able to chuse a good Counsellor, and of his Virtue, not to render such a Counsellor useless to himself; for he that will receive Counsel must have no pretincture, or preingagement, or no Biass, which may draw him off from judging, what is said unto him. He must have no petty-Counsellors or Favourites of Pleasure, to stagger his Resolutions by Whispers. He must shut his Ears unto Flatterers, for if he once believe that sort of Men, in what they say in Commendation of himself, he will soon believe them in what they say against others: So as *Julian's* reply unto a Man, that highly commended him was very remarkable, *When,*  
Sir,

Sir, says he, " You have told me as freely of my " Faults, as you have of the Excellencies you pretend to see in me, then I will give belief to what " you say now. And *Aristotle's* Epistle unto *Alexander* is most remarkable, wherein he told him, He was most glad to understand, that he was not as too many Princes were, so scornful, and unreasonable, as to make good Advice ridiculous. This was worthy of so great a Man's taking notice of, for nothing makes serious Men sooner desert a Prince's Interest, than to be under a slighted Character; for *Cicero* in his Offices observes, many Men will lose their Lives for a Prince, who will not lose their Reputations. I once heard these Buffoons, that thus pleased a Prince, called by a serious Gentleman the Petards of a Court; for said he, by representing any Man in a Disguise, or Masquerade, they will blow up his Credit presently.

If a Prince have a known Bias, he will too soon be observed, and a Common Understanding at a Court will make that appear Wisdom, which really is but Flattery; for there is scarce any one Maxim in Policy which is not combated by some other; therefore they that study their own preferment or Security, not their Prince's Establishment or Honour, will soon find the weaker Reason that gratifies the stronger Passion of a Prince, is ever accepted, and rewarded, when the stronger Reason is misinterpreted, as a disaffection. Princes therefore must discountenance a Man's Advice; for a wise Prince, like a good Huntsman, must encourage the Dog that hunts for the Scent as well as he that hits it. And Counsel, that is sincere, must be grateful, and the Counsellor if he speak in private, his Counsel must be kept in private; for if the  
Prince

Prince expose him to a contrary Faction, it will create that Caution, that he will want Freedom of Advice, when the other wants his security in advising. Thus Princes must not call their Counsellors as *Xerxes* did, and then tell them, "He call'd them, to bring obedient Minds not troublesome debates: And if a Prince would be well advised, he must advise early, for there is no Comfort to say, Sir, the Time is past, or it's too late now to think on it. A Prince should have no Counsellor to be so mean, as to be a reproach unto him, nor so lofty as to reproach him; for the very Errors of a Prince are to be concealed, or respectfully laid open before him, and to be as much as may be concealed from others.

My Lord *Bacon* " Says, a Prince should have " but few, and those well chosen Counsellors, that " they may carry on his Business with one Spirit " of Direction; therefore he observes Wise *Henry* the Seventh made use only of Bishop *Morton*, and Bishop *Fox*. Over greatness in one, or over strict Combination in a few may be both dangerous to him. He may keep his Ear open unto many, but he must not let them run into Factions against one another, if he hope to be served by any, for they will wreak their spight against one another at the price of his disservice; if both concur not in his Business, he deceives himself if he thinks he hath use of either. If he carry himself with indifference unto their particular Concerns. he may make use both of their Advices and Interests unto his own Service. And any other way of managing Factions and keeping them at odds, unto my observation was never useful unto any Prince; if either of them have a predominancy with him, at least so by turns

turns as one checks the other, both deserve him.

The best way of a Prince to know the Nature of him he would make a Councillor of, is, to know him by Domesticks, and Neighbours, and general Vogue; for from these no Man can conceal himself, or his natural Inclinations. Enemies will traduce him, Friends overvalue him, but these (if what they say flow naturally from themselves) best discover him. And the Councillor's nature is as much to be considered as his Abilities; for tho' Princes most commonly best esteem of Subtil Men, it is moral good Men best advance their Service; for a Mind not seasoned with Morality, like the delicatest Wines, will best please the Taste for a time, but soon grow prick'd, or Sower, or some trick they will play at last, harms more than any of their Services do good.

When Piety therefore is joined unto natural *Characters of a Councillor* Abilities, ripeness of Age, and good Experience, (as early having entred into Business) then a Prince may expect, not only an able, but a faithful Councillor. If Piety be wanting, Abilities will turn but unto Compliances, and self ends or serving some Faction rather than the Prince; for Moral Virtue is the only restraint upon self Interest. Abilities destitute of Piety seldom advance a Prince's Service, and he is likeliest best to serve his Prince on Earth, who serves his God in Heaven, for Piety only can restrain the ill Effects of Ambition, or Covetousness, or lead a Man to prefer his Master's Service more than any Provision for Wife and Children. It is the Honour of *Cardinal Toledo*, that he refused to be of the King's Council, without he might declare God's Will in opposition unto the Impiety  
 I of

of modern Policies. Without natural Abilities in a Councillor, Men expect a harvest without having sowed the Field, and if it were sowed, and the Seed Corn not good (*viz.* sowed with Principles Epicurean, Machiavillian or Hobbists) they will never serve to govern a free People, they may to render Men Slaves. If Councillors be not grave, and Aged Persons, they that are to obey their Councils, will not reverence them, or cheerfully submit, for young Men must want Experience, and without Experience the best Abilities will be subject unto gross Errors. A States Man, or indeed any Man in any Course of Life, must be broken unto Business (or *compu aux Affaires*) before any other Man can confidently depend on him, for he is not to be depended on, to guide an Affair that hath not seen both sides of Fortune, or met with disasters as well as good Successes, or observed them carefully in History. When young Men give the Counsel, the matter of it is most commonly violent; for their Temper leads either unto rash and daring things, such as may endanger the Settlement of the present State (which no wise Prince for increase of Jurisdiction, or Prerogative should ever adventure) or unto Wit, or Reparties, which are proper for Discourses at a Table, but not for the gravity of a Council-board; for commonly they gain their Esteem by Judgments they make on things past, or by Reflection on an Affair in general, not by Councils or Determinations on somewhat that is present and particular. Indeed it is a great Miracle to think Men with Wit, with some mixture of Latin, and Greek, or Foreign Languages make the properest Persons for Business. A great Man both of Wit and Learning *Thucydæes* deter-

mines

mines against it: *Hebetiores, quam Viri Acutiores melius Rempublicam administrant*: The more Grave rather than the more Acute sort of Men, make the best Ministers of a Commonwealth. Young and witty Men have too much phancy, to examine their own Judgment, and their warm temper makes them persecute an Affair with eagerness at First, and remissness towards the End, *acriis initiis, sed incurioso Fine*, and they are too likely, rashly to run into Errors, and by unseasonable Remedies to endeavour the Cure, or *ab intempestivis remediis delicta accendunt*, I use the Author's Words (though the method of writing be out of fashion) because I would strengthen my self with their Authorities. Besides, young and witty Men value themselves much, by being not restrained by ancient forms of Business, for usually they find some way more expedite, and seemingly more reasonable, which usually upon Trial is found otherwise, for they argue their own change, or what they make is a State of Melioration; but they foresee not the inconveniences which attend upon their own project, whilst *Thucydides* observes the Nations which were less prone, to change their Customs, were most commonly esteemed the wisest. Besides Men of this Age, and Temper, as they are most inclined to be vain-glorious, so less capable of Secrecy; whilst Age, and Experience render Men apter to give wholesome than complying Counsel, as not to be too strictly tyed unto old Forms and Customs, so not to part with them, but upon great Examination; all which is the Evidence of a judicious Mind.

Nothing therefore Characters a Counsellor better than that it may be truly said of him, he is a sincere Man, or as we say of a good Common-wealths

wealths Man: He is one that prefers the publick Concern before his own private Interest. So a good Councillor will in Affairs that are Important, rather consider his Master's Service, than his Master's Inclination; and that I may set down all the Extremities of Integrity at once (but I am afraid I am describing *Rara avis in terris*) A Man that will lose his Place, or Fortune, or Favour rather than not plainly, and without Artifice tell his Master betwixt them two, what is his Opinion; afterwards though his Master's Judgment be like to be his Master's prejudice (because Councillors are not Preceptors) that will industriously obey his Master's Commands, as he wou'd have done, if his Master's Commands had been grounded upon his own Council; for he ought to think, that his Master's Opinion or Inclinations may be better than his own. When the Prince cannot admit this Freedom, nor the Councillor (in case there be nothing immoral in it) make this Submission, neither of them is fit for the other, If the Princes own Councils cast what is settled into danger, or make it to be obtained by Extremities (though not Illegalities) upon his own Subjects, a good Man would rather make his retreat, and die obscurely, than see his Master, or his Country run a great Risque: For it was *Calisthenes* his great Honour, not that he is said never to have betrayed his Prince unto others, but because he would never condescend to betray him to himself, as most Flatterers do, or concur with him when his Opinion differed. Thus it is one thing to obey a Prince, another to counsel him.

This imaginary Sincerity (for we may rather describe it, than hope to meet with it) in a Prince's Councillors will incline him that thus values simplicity of Mind, to avoid all subtil and underhand Ways; for a Man of this Temper is a judging or thinking Person, and he knows human Actions are best managed by familiar and easy means; for the plain-hearted Man, who resolves singly to have his Eye upon the Nature of the Business he is to act in, (and he cannot well understand the Nature of an Affair, if he totally forget the Conjunction of the times, and Persons engag'd about it) he will discard Subtilty, and not super-refine upon that which may end well, if he make not new Adventures, that might *conclude better*: Since as *Cardinal Mazarine* observed the *Faisons mieux* spoiled more Business, than ever it advanced, for Subtilty commonly sows Thorns, and often is forced to walk over them; *Machiavill's Borgia* thus prickt his own Feet, and so did *Pope Clement* the VIIth, and *D'Avila* observes, *Henry* the IIIrd, grew weary of the Intrigues his Secretary *Villeroy* had intangled him in, and *Bentivoglio* shews *Cardinal Granvill's* dexterities proved *Philip* the IIIrd's Intanglements. A Prince or Councillor therefore must not consider the Advantages, the end he proposes will get him, and forget that the Complexion of the times, and the Humours of Subjects may be indomitable, or superable with so much hazard, that it will be no Wisdom, to put a Prince's Fortune upon the chance of a Dye. A Prince's greatness should rise, like a Vegetable, indiscernably, for hastning to be rich, and to be great, or absolute, are both dangerous.

No Man will be long thus sincere, or honest, who hath not Courage; for it is an Act of bravery, to seek his Master's Advantage before his own, for Courage frees him from the Sollicitude of diving into his Masters Inclinations, or scrutinizing *abditos Sensus Principis*, or being concern'd what Party stands in opposition to him, or what harm they can do him, which Thoughts take up the whole time of a timorous Councillor who prostitutes both his Masters, and his own Honour for a little Security. This Temper is ever reclaiming Rebellions by Caresses or Expedients, and spends most of their Advice in shoving up the House they plainly see will fall, but hope it will last their time. Their Trade is how to observe which party in a Court prevail, and to be officious towards it, and they care not in what languishing Condition their Masters Affairs are, so their own Post be safe; with the *Amsterdam Dog* they will at best defend their Shoulder of Mutton for a time, but when they see the other Dogs have pull'd it out of the Basket, they will go in for their Share. It was faintness in Council lost both *Rome* and *Constantinople*, and, I may say, *England*, or the Monarchy in King *Charles* the First's time. His Army's Discipline rendred them not formidable to the Rebels, and yet the Counsellors were afraid of their too great Prosperity.

A good Councillor should be steady in his Advice, but steadiness differs much from Inflexibility. He that adheres to Principles is reckned steady; yet, when the conjuncture of Affairs requires it, he must strike Sail, and he can own it; for, says *Cicero*, as Affairs submit themselves often to me, so must I sometimes unto them; *Ut mihi Res sic me rebus submittere cogor.*

And

And *Cato*, had he been less positive, had preserved *Rome's*, or the Senate's Freedom longer. *Cato optime sentit, sed saepe Reipubl. nocebat*. Probity may be impetuous, and so consequently nocent. Flexibility may suit with Judgment, because forced by Necessity; but Instability can no way be justified, because it is a natural inconstancy of Mind, or weakness of Reasoning.

A wise Councillor will not engross too many Affairs into his own Hands, nor encroach upon other Mens Offices, nor be apt to undervalue them in it, to raise his own Credit by the loss of other Mens; for he that doth good Offices unto others, is in the best way to make hearty Friends for himself; and he must be patient to hear other Mens Advices, nay with some respectfulness bear their Follies: and he must be unconcerned when his own Councils are not complied with, or are laid aside. Above all, a Privy-Councillor should be secret, for without secrecy neither Arms nor Council are like to be successful. *Augustus* valued *Mæcenæ* for his Secrecy, *Agrippa* for his laborious Patience, and *Virgil* for his pleasurable and learned Conversation. If there be a Chink in a Council Chamber it discovers, or gives as much light as a Window doth in another Room. Our great Chancellor *Bacon* recommends it unto Princes, to beware that they themselves unsecret not their own Affairs; for crafty Men will lay trains by Discourses of one kind, to find the secret Resolutions of another kind; so it is dangerous for Princes personally to treat with foreign Ambassadors, &c.

But least this should seem a *Platonick* Republick, or rather a Speculation than any thing that was probably practical, or might dishearten Princes from looking after such Men, to make Councillors

*How much  
it is in the  
Power of a  
Prince to  
make good  
Counsellors  
for himself.*

cellors of, we will only say, if Custom and Habits can change Natures, Princes can do as much: for if the Prince will chiefly favour Men of good natural Endowments, and of a Moral Honesty (which will soon turn into Piety) and if he encourage Industry, and let young Men perceive they must walk up unto Preferments by Stairs and Degrees, and beginning with the lower Offices before they can hopefully pretend unto the highest; if he find not good Men to serve him, he will make Men fit to serve him. So as it is much the Prince's own fault when he thinks a Favourite of Pleasure or Sports, Conversation and Divertisement, must presently be fit to be made a Guide in business (for he can give the Place, but he hath not Omnipotency, to give the Abilities) or when he will look upon no Man himself but through a Glass, or as the Image of a Man is reflected unto him from a Favourite, or some great Officer, for this is to strengthen their Root and weaken his own; for here, though the Guilt is his, the Obligation is another's. This makes him have many Attendants, but few Servants; for Servants placed about him by great Men, are rather their Spies than his Servants: Such an unconcernedness as this, who is about him, makes him appear like a Town blockt up; he can freely receive no Provisions he stands in need of; and his own Servants are disheartned by perceiving great Mens Friends, or Servants every day preferred, or gratified before them. This course chills all publick spiritedness; for Men introduced by Favourites, think they shall last no longer than their Patrons, who are often changed, or in the Wain; and so they come unto a Court like Harvest-Men, who serve only in a short time to reap that which others plough'd and harrow'd;

or they work only in fair Weather, and when the Corn is carrying into the Barn. If a Prince therefore have ill Servants, he owes much of it unto his own negligence, or not valuing that which he stands most in need of.

And thus from his great Councillors or Ministers of State, we will come to reflect upon his Menial Servants, and say somewhat of his little Family or Court, and then of his great Family or Common-weal, or the several Orders of Men in the Common-weal, each of them being to be a part of his Regal study, for by them he may be served, or he may be indangered; and neither servant nor Subject will be long useful, when he observes there is no observation of what he doth: And nothing may shew a Prince more his declension, than when both these sorts of Men are unconcern'd, whether he be pleased or displeased with their Service. And very often the Irreverence that is paid him in his own Court, is the Mother of the neglect of his Commands out of it: or that the Discontents of the one breed the Malevolence of the other. Yet it is a great Evidence, a Government is off of its Hinges when few forward and daring Men openly oppose his Affairs, and many cautious ill-willers are pleased with it; and scarce any are ready to assert his Rights, rather as *Tacitus* expresses it in his Terms, *habitus animorum fuit, ut pessimum facinus uiderent pauci, plures uellent, omnes paterentur*: When Mens Minds stood so affected, that few durst attempt the utmost Crime, more were willing to have it done, all would have been content had it been done.

Libels and licentious Discourses are ill Symptoms, and false News easily spread, and when Men in place speak fearfully, and those that in-

vade Government boldly, it is a sign Reverence is lost. *Tacitus* expresse it, when they speak, *Liberius quam ut Imperantium meminissent* : So freely that they seem'd not to remember they had Governours. Or, *Quando mallet mandata Imperantium interpretari, quam exequi* ; When they had rather make Comments upon their Commands than obey them. Discontents among the Vulgar, and broken Estates among the great Ones, or if there be other combustible matter, no Man knows how small a spark, or from whence it may come, that will set all on fire. When Fear is greater than Feeling, Jealousies will admit of no Reasoning : and when there is a general dissolution of Manners, there is seldom found Authority enough to reclaim that People, but some notable Change follows ; for there is in a State in some conjuncture of Time, as discernable a publick Madness as there is in private Men, and perchance I have lived to see it abroad or at home more than once.

A Prince's Court is a little Republick, and it is a great Sign that the Prince is in the Affection of his People, when his Servants are respected through his whole Kingdom, for the Reverence they bear him ; which if it be pay'd by some few great Men of the Place where they come, it is soon imitated by all the rest of the Country. Therefore his Servants, usually called Courtiers, must be courteous and civil in their Sphere, as they are willing to be kindly treated when they are in other Mens ; so as a Prince's Family ought to be Persons well chosen, and of good Reputation and Behaviour ; and the nigher in Relation or Service the Person is unto the King, the more Humanity and Kindness he should shew to those who come to Court, especially those that come rather to pay  
a Dut

a Duty than make a Suit; for this last sort are to be answered friendly, but still according unto the nature of the Request. Access ought to be easie, and answers made with gentleness as well as reasonableness, for the Hand of Haughtiness is not to reach even a Curtesy: for where the receiver is discontented in the manner of it, the Favour conferred is never half acknowledged.

A Prince should not admit about his Person Men of bold Tempers, and who dare openly avow immoral Tenets or Principles; for these Men will soon call that which is Good, indifferent, and then they will not be long before, they will call that which is vicious, reasonable; and artificially insinuating into his Favour, by keeping intelligence with his Passions, they will endeavour to lead him from Vanity into Vice, and the fouler the latter is, if they be but an Instrument or Companion in it, the securer they are in his Grace; for there is at a Court no such ready way unto Gain and Preferment, as that which is got by some shameful Service; and such Men being privy unto a Prince's clandestine Vices, they will never be quiet until they be admitted into his publick Concerns. Such trivial Servants, or smaller sort of Favourites as these, have Politicks fitted to secure themselves. There is nothing (say they) so safe for a Prince, as to make new Creatures of his own; a Prince must be constant, and adhere even unto his Errors, rather than be lightly carried over unto other Mens judgments, lest he seem to live upon a borrowed Reason. Hence it is, or from such small Favourites as these it is, that some Historians have observed, that when the Spring-heads of some Princes Counsels have been discovered, they are small even unto Contempt. *Darius* his Expedition in-

to Greece arose either from a Physician unto himself, who told him what excellent Figs grew there, or from his Wife's Maid, who told her, *If the King made a War upon that Land, she would have the great Ladies of Greece her Slaves.* Varro hath the like Observation, and Monsieur de Pleffis assigns much of the Miseries that beset the French Nation upon the Catholick League, unto the Duke of Guise's cheating of Monsieur d'Espernon of a Miss. And thus often a Favourite's Passion begins a War, as well as a Prince's publick Interest. On the lower sort of smaller Favourites Boccalini puts a high Contempt, when he says, *All the Money in a Prince's Treasure will not buy Sugar enough to candie, or sweeten them.* The Abbot d'Escally I remember long since at Brussels told me a very pleasant Story, how his wise Master the Duke of Savoy (*le Viel Renard des Mountaines*) took from him an elegant Barber that he had, who grew so great a Favourite, that he trusted him in some of his important Services, in which miscarrying he complain'd unto the Abbot; *Sir (says the Abbot) concern not me herein, for I put him unto the outside of your Head, you put him into the inside.* A Prince therefore must be very careful in the choice of his Servants, that they be Men equal unto their business, and not above it, or under it, honest minded, as well as strong brain'd; for to serve faithfully is as necessary, as to serve ably, since Abilities seldom make recompences for frauds, and since honest Men in Favour will seldom want the Parts

A Favourite of pleasure allowable, but not to be made a Favourite of business.

of able Men not yet admitted thereunto. Balzac says truly, *the Greatness of a Prince must not rob him of the pleasantest part of human Passion, the free and kind Conversation of some Person; whom by some secret and unaccountable*

motion

motion he likes in Conversation ; for neither moral Vertue nor Policy puts any such Restraint upon Nature, these correct the imperfections of sensual Appetites, but gratifie both great and small Inclinations in natural and not immoral Contentments. But publick Ministers, or such as are privately employed about publick Affairs, are to be chosen by Reason, not Affection. Such choices as hath been already observed *Augustus* made, when he drew into his Affection and Service, both *Mecenas*, *Horace*, and *Virgil*, who were qualified as well to be Councillors as Companions. Besides, an ill Favourite is often a necessary Instrument or Skreen unto a worse Prince ; for *Tacitus* observes, *Tiberius* was worse without *Sejanus* than with him : and People wreak their ill-will rather upon these, than on their Prince.

Nothing is meant more here, than that a Favourite of Pleasure should not be a Favourite of Business. A Prince should be the Master of the Spring-head himself, that he may water when he pleases ; for if he suffer himself to be grossed, and passes his Influences by another <sup>unequal</sup> ~~unequal~~ all his Dependents, he may have outward Reverence, but never inward Esteem ; for such uncontrollable Favourites for the most part, as they are very expensive in themselves, so they are very insolent unto others : and therefore upright and able Men will not serve under them. Thus they are like Beacons or Light-Houses at Sea, which old Sailors know are to be avoided, and young make towards them in the Night, and endanger a Shipwrack.

These, and many more troublesome Considerations a Prince hath about his Domesticks or little <sup>A Prince's great Family, or Orders of Men in his Nation.</sup> Family ; many more than he must have about his great Family or Common weal ; for as Individuals or single Men are to be considered, so every Rank

Rank or Profession of Men are to be weighed by him, since his Security or his Danger hath in several Periods of Times arisen, as his Nobility or Commons, nay as his Clergy have been affected and predominant. Nay he is to observe even the natural and constant Clime of his Country, for that will learn him much of the Temper of his Subjects in general; for, as *Barclay* says, *Hæret quædam vis inconcussæ hominibus pro conditione Terrarum*. And some Ages run unto Arms, others unto Learning, some unto Trade, some unto Superstition in their Religion or Phanaticism; with all these difficulties his Spirit of Government must grapple, and without a Spirit of Government he will miscarry, or if he please not himself in the Affairs of his Government, or if it be his Task, not part of his pleasure. A Prince's Politicks will be as prosperous as his Oeconomicks are, who loves to spend freely, and yet never to look upon an Account.

---

F I N I S.

# ADVERTISEMENT.

*Just Published,*

**A** Dialogue between *Timothy* and *Philatheus*, the second *Volume*; Containing a complete Answer to the remaining Chapters of the *Rights of the Christian Church*. In this *Volume*, the Doctrine of Passive Obedience and Non-Resistance is impartially stated, and prov'd from Reason, Antiquity, and Scripture; the Revolution justify'd and reconcil'd with *that* Principle; the Republican Scheme Historically traced from its Original, and thoroughly examin'd and confuted; the *Rights* Account of Episcopacy, of University-Learning, of the Toleration, of Parties, of Morality, Occasional Conformity, Ordination, with all his other material Objections to the Civil and Ecclesiastical Constitution, are fairly stated and reply'd to.

*N. B.* The third and last *Volume* is now in the Press, in which the Primitive and Present State of the Church of *England* are describ'd in Conformity to the Apostolick Age; the Logick of the *Rights* examin'd, and both the Historical and Argumentative Part of his *Preface* discuss'd at large; To which are added *six* other Tracts; 1. A Letter to the Author, against the first Defence of the *Rights*. 2. The Trial of the *Rights*, in answer to the second Defence. 3. Some Account of *Hugo Grotius*, and Mr. *Hales*. 4. The Country Parson's Answer to the Country-Attorney. 5. A Vindication of Dr. *M. T.* 6. A Letter to Monsieur *Le Clerc* in Latin.

*Likewise in the Press,*

**A** *Essay* upon *Nothing*, a Work of great Learning; tending to reconcile all *Parties*.

Both Printed for *Bernard Lintott*, at the *Cross Keys* between the two *Temple-Gates*, *Fleetstreet*.









